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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
The analyses conducted in this paper are based on the topic “Banks and their capital 
structure”. Banks can finance themselves with deposits. This is unique and can not be 
done by other institutions or firms. Moreover, regulation requires banks to follow 
compulsory rules when deciding about the capital structure. 
 
The paper is organized the following way. 
First, different theories of bank capital in the literature are described. The discussion 
touches the irrelevance of financing by Modigliani and Miller (1958), market theories 
(competition) by Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2006), capital structure under asymmetric 
information by Diamond and Rajan (2000), capital structure and deposit insurance by 
Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000), and  capital structure and liquidity by Peck and Shell 
(2010). Furthermore, if available in the literature, the theories are supported with 
empirical evidence.  
Second, the capital structure is under scrutiny. It is analysed which components do 
influence the equity to total asset ratio. Additionally, the amount of deposits is 
interesting. The influence of different variables on deposits is examined.  
Third, a short part on capital regulation is written. Furthermore, the influence of 
regulation on the capital buffer held is analysed. 
Fourth, the paper looks at the capital buffers of banks. Of special interest are factors 
that influence the amount of capital buffer held.  
The last section consists of an empirical part. The theory and the methods explained in 
the paper are applied to the data that consists of European banks. Since regulation does 
not seem to be the only constraint or influence on the capital structure of banks, the 
questions are whether and how do variables influence the equity ratio, the capital buffer 
and the amount of deposits held by banks. The research is conducted with regressions 
that are applied to the data set. It is attempted to find variables other than regulation that 
actually do define the capital structure of banks. 
 2 
2 Bank financing  
2.1 The Irrelevance of Capital Structure 
2.1.1 The Theory 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the value of a firm is independent of 
whether it is debt or equity financed.1 It seems to be rather intuitive that this model 
might not be applicable for banks since they operate in a different environment than 
corporations. Additionally, the existence of deposits and bank runs is rather unique for 
the banking industry. 
However, Merton (1995) points out that the Modigliani and Miller theorem can not 
just be dismissed because of the simple fact that the underlying business is banking. 
Additionally, the model does talk about the existing equity and about how costly raising 
new equity is. Furthermore, it seems that demand deposits are not so different from 
other securities, since most companies could issue bonds with similar characteristics. 
Therefore, demand deposits do not represent a financing advantage for banks. 
Moreover, the existence of deposit insurance is treated as a net subsidy. However, it is 
argued that the costs of insurance premiums often outweigh the benefits. Therefore, 
insurance must not have a positive net influence.2 
Additionally, Miller (1995) argues that a 100% equity financed bank could exist due 
to the fact that the return on equity is variable and not fixed. It depends on the assets’ 
risks but also on the amount of leverage a bank has. Therefore, a bank’s costs of equity 
are lower if it holds less debt. The author talks about a bank which has costs of equity of 
6% and is supposed to have a return on asset of 8%. Although the book value of the 
equity might not reflect the higher return, the bank’s shares will sell at a premium. This 
will make up for the lower return on equity. This works also the other way, in the case 
that, the bank is underpriced on the market. Additional leverage would not change that 
mispricing. At some point additional debt does no longer carry net benefits. The higher 
leverage would be reflected in a higher cost of equity.3  
                                                 
1
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) p.268 
2
 Miller (1995) p.484-486 
3
 Miller (1995) p.486-487 
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These explanations state that the capital structure does not matter and Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) is a valid concept, even in banking.4 
 
2.1.2 The Empirical Evidence 
DeYoung and Yom (2008) analyse the change of the asset and liability management 
over the years. They blame a maturity mismatch of the active and passive side of the 
balance sheet for the crisis in 2007-2008.5 They argue that over time, the development 
of new financial products has helped banks to become less depended on asset and 
liability management. Furthermore, deregulation and an increased share of non-interest 
based income have also contributed to a decrease of its importance. This means that 
insuring against interest rate is no longer exclusively done by matching maturities of the 
asset and the liability side. The natural hedge of assets and liabilities has declined in 
importance for banks. These facts lead to the assumption that assets and liabilities are 
no longer strongly correlated.6 The authors explore the following question: “have bank 
assets and liabilities become measurably more independent over time?”7. Moreover, 
they want to know if all the new interest derivates and products are responsible for a 
measurably independence. They use canonical correlation in order to detect the 
relationship between assets and liabilities.8 
The sample under scrutiny consists of US commercial banks from the years 1990-
2005. The data is provided on a yearly basis and analyses are conducted with five years 
subsamples in order to detect any changes in the relationship. Additionally, the banks 
are put in different groups based on their size of assets. Furthermore, the asset side is 
split up into six subgroups and the liability side in five subgroups. These analyses 
already reveal some trends. Banks seem to have less cash and short term securities on 
their balance sheets. It is assumed that due to higher competition banks are forced to 
better manage their assets and invest into assets that provide them higher returns. 
Another explanation can be that advanced clearing systems make it unnecessary to hold 
as much cash as before. Furthermore, better excess to the liquidity market could have 
led to the decrease in cash. Moreover, the maturities have shifted from short term to 
more long term horizons on the balance sheets. This is the result of a better capital 
                                                 
4
 Miller (1995) p.487 
5
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.275-276 
6
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p-278 
7
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.276 
8
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.276, 283 
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market access for business owners and the higher engagement of commercial banks in 
the mortgages sector. The change in maturities would have an impact on the interest risk 
for banks. This means that longer maturities on the asset side also require longer 
maturities on the liability side. It could turn out difficult to find a natural hedge on the 
liability side for the asset. Nowadays, due to the existence of new financial products the 
severity of this problem has significantly declined.9 
The changes of the liability side of the balance sheet reveal how diverse banks of 
different sizes have become. Smaller banks lost core deposits whereas demand deposits 
experienced significant growth. This proves that small business clients are the key 
element in the daily life of small banks. Furthermore, it reveals the increased 
competition between banks for core deposits. Nowadays, smaller banks find it more 
difficult to attract consumer deposits than their larger competitors. The effect is of 
course vice versa with larger banks. They have growing core deposits on their balance 
sheets. These outcomes indicate that the maturity of core deposits is now higher for 
larger banks and lower for smaller banks. There is no difference in the development of 
purchased funds in smallest or largest banks. These funds follow an upward path. 
Furthermore, the amount of equity held has significantly increased. This is due to tighter 
regulations but is also a result of high retained earning when the industry has been 
booming.10 
DeYoung and Yom (2008) only report correlations that are at least 0.3 and are so-
called strong correlations. It can be seen that the strong correlations between assets and 
liabilities are more obvious in the larger bank analyses. One explanation can be that 
larger banks are indeed more engaged in asset and liability management. On the other 
hand, a non homogeneous small group or noise can create that outcome. Last, it can just 
mean that the model implied is just better suited for larger than for smaller banks.11 
Comparing the asset and the liability side pair-wise already reveals interesting results. 
32 strong correlations can be observed between cash and demand deposits. Out of those 
11 are positively correlated. Simultaneously three have a negative cash and core deposit 
relationship. Furthermore, seven strong correlations show a positive relationship 
between long term loans and core deposits. Last, equity is assumed to have a positive 
correlation with long term securities in five cases. These findings are interesting 
because they indicate that retained earnings are not held in cash or short term 
                                                 
9
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.283-285 
10
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.286-287 
11
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.287 
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investments. Instead they are invested into liquid but highly profitable assets. However, 
it can also be interpreted as banks becoming even more risk avers, since they have 
higher capital and at the same time less risky investments for their profits. These results 
support the observations mentioned above.12 
The fact that the correlation of assets and liabilities is stronger for larger banks is also 
true for the canonical correlations. The canonical variables associated with the liability 
side are responsible for 7% of the diversification of the asset side. The result is much 
higher when conducted vice versa. In that case the asset side explains 12% of the 
accounts on the liability side. This can lead to the conclusion that banks find an 
investment project first and than look for financing.13 Furthermore, the redundancy 
coefficient indicates that the canonical correlation is determined by a low amount of 
individual relationships between the asset and the liability side. A strong and significant 
relationship between assets and liabilities is discovered. In the first panel (based on the 
first loading) the most obviously correlated variables are long term loans and core 
deposits. The results point into a positive direction, which indicates that those two 
accounts do move in the same direction. Such a relationship is not in conflict with the 
maturity mismatch assumption since more deposits make it possible to invest long term 
without taking on a significant interest rate risk. The same relationship is discovered for 
short term loans and purchased funds. That kind of investment can be critical due to 
interest risk. Therefore, purchased funds are best invested into short term products, 
preferable with high returns.14  
The second panel (based on second loadings) reveals that long term securities and 
equity are strongly positively correlated. This relationship is not unexpected because it 
has been already detected by pair wise correlations. Moreover, a positive relationship of 
cash holding and demand deposits is shown.15 
In order to be able to actually find the development of asset and liability dependence 
or independence the authors look at the annual redundancy coefficients. These are 
measured for the period of 1990-2005 and once split up in asset size quartiles and once 
in asset size deciles.16 The first analyses, where it is tested how much “the liability 
canonical correlations explain the variation of the actual asset account data”17, does not 
                                                 
12
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.287 
13
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.290 
14
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.275-290 
15
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.290-293 
16
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.294 
17
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.294 
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reveal a significant pattern.18 However, when testing how much “the asset canonical 
correlations explain the variation of the actual liability account data”19 the results gain 
more importance.20 The redundancy coefficient is higher. Furthermore, the dependence 
of asset and liabilities is obviously depended on the bank’s size. Last, it can be seen that 
over time the coefficient gets smaller for larger banks, which means that the asset and 
the liability side get more independent. This can be explained with the existence of the 
financial innovations. However, the findings for smaller banks are the other way round. 
The redundancy coefficient is gaining importance. Assets and liabilities are becoming 
more dependent. The result could be driven by the fact that small banks have increased 
in size along the sample period. Therefore, the redundancy coefficient indicates that 
small banks and large banks have moved closer together, at least as far as the level of 
the redundancy coefficient is concerned.21 
DeYoung and Yom (2008) find that indeed the existence of financial innovations 
related to interest rate risk has a negative impact on the banks’ asset management. The 
results indicate that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) concept seems to be more 
applicable to banks nowadays. Moreover, it can be concluded that asset and liability 
management is no longer the only tool of interest risk management.22 
 
2.2 The optimal Capital Structure under Asymmetric Information 
The following theory assumes that the kind of financing matters. An important 
assumption is the one related to asymmetric information. A bank or intermediary can 
create value if it knows more than another investor who joins the project at a later point 
in time.23 In that case the theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not seem 
applicable anymore. 
 
2.2.1 The business model in banking 
Banks do differ from regular firms. In order to understand the reasons behind their 
financing decisions their business model has to be known. The core activities are the 
                                                 
18
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.294 
19
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.294 
20
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.294 
21
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.293-296 
22
 DeYoung and Yom (2008) p.296 
23
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2431 
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provision of liquidity and credits to other business agents. Diamond and Rajan (2000) 
describe the environment as follows: there are agents, who have a business with which 
they can generate additional profits due to their private skills. There is a need for outside 
funding. Furthermore, an investor has always the possibility to either proceed with the 
project or to liquidate it. This means that the agent can be replaced by another agent 
who is only slightly less skilled than the previous. On the other side, the business 
agent’s bargaining power is his ability to generate the highest rents possible with this 
business. The earlier in the business cycle a lender starts to invest his money, the better 
he is informed about the business itself and the related activities. So an earlier 
investment has a higher payout than an investment made at a later point of time. 
Moreover, the better informed an investor is, the higher is the amount he can lend and 
the greater is his bargain power towards the agent. However, the funds he is able to raise 
from outside investors are smaller than the original loan since the new investors are 
missing that information advantage.24 It can be seen that the problem lies in the fact that 
human factors are attached to the original project. The project and the skills to run it are 
necessary to be able to sell the business and to create liquidity. 25 
 
2.2.2  Banks financed by deposits and equity 
If a bank issues deposits it is obligated to pay the investors back on a first come, first 
served basis. In the worst case scenario, investors who come last do not receive back 
their initial investment. Therefore, depositors will always run and demand their 
investment back when they feel insecure about the future performance of the bank. 
Moreover, depositors are not willing to renegotiate lending conditions because for the 
individual it is always more profitable to try to get back the total amount invested, even 
if that is realised at the costs of other depositors. 26 This is called the “collective action 
problem”27. 
Assuming that a bank is optimally financed by deposits and assuming a banker who 
tries to generate some extra profits by considering selling the business to a less skilled 
agent would lead to the following scenario: the depositors would have to give some of 
their gains to the banker, additionally, they would assume their investment is no longer 
                                                 
24
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2431-2432 
25
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2432 
26
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2432 
27
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2432 
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safe and therefore, start a run at the bank. In order to prevent this from happening and to 
keep the depositors as clients the banker acts just as intermediate agent who will make 
sure to receive the money from the business agent back and repay depositors. In order to 
prevent a bank run, any additional gains will go to the depositors. It can be seen that 
under certainty a bank is optimally financed by deposits.28 
However, in an environment with uncertainty a solely deposit financed bank is 
suboptimal because than the bank is exposed to risk such as fluctuations in the value of 
the assets. A sudden drop in value would lead to a bank run without previous changes in 
the banker’s behaviour.29 In order to prevent such a scenario from happening, a banker 
is well advised to raise equity which can not participate in a bank run. Equity, as a 
residual claimant, offers security to a bank. However, it comes at a cost namely, that 
bankers can generate extra profits since the equity holders lack the bank run as 
bargaining instrument. Therefore, in a one period model, the bank is best financed by 
deposits and equity. The amount of equity depends on the before mentioned trade off.30 
In a model with several periods, the banker gains the opportunity to renegotiate with 
the business agent as far as, for example, maturity is concerned. In the end, a higher 
amount of capital has a positive effect for the banker’s gains, provides the bank with 
stability against bank runs and enables to gain a better bargaining position towards the 
business agent.31 
 
2.2.2.1 Single Period Model 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) introduce a model with the following characteristics and 
relationships. First, it is assumed that the model has two periods. Furthermore, the 
relationships explained above can be applied. Therefore, a business is financed by a 
lender who has an information advantage over outside loaners. The business agent 
creates additional value by conducting the business with his special skills. At the end of 
the second period the business agent will try to receive better conditions compared to 
those which have been established in form of a contract at time 0. He can do so by 
making the use of his skills in the future depended on the negotiation result in time 2. 
                                                 
28
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2432-2433 
29
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2433 
30
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2433 
31
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2433 
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The business agent will make a new offer to the lender which leads to the following 
reactions.32 
1. Turn down the new suggested payment and sell the underlying assets.33 
2. Acceptance of the proposal.34 
3. Turn down the offer and take the business away to the next best skilled 
business agent.35 
The first answer results in a lower collection sum for the lender since the liquidation 
price is lower than the borrower’s original promised repayment. The second one, 
obviously results in a lower price. For the business agent it makes only sense to pay less 
to the investor than what was written in the first contract. The last option decreases the 
repayment too, since employing the personal skills of the original business agent 
generates the highest profits. It can be seen that the business agent has an advantage in 
the negotiation. In the end the business agent will offer the liquidation value since this is 
the maximum price the lender can get without the special skills of the business agent.36 
The lender can act as intermediary and finance his outstanding loan with outside 
investors. First, it is assumed that they can invest in form of equity. His information 
advantage makes it possible to collect a higher amount than the outside investors would 
be able to get. Therefore, the lender (=bank) has a bargaining advantage over the 
outside investors at maturity (t=2). In the event of renegotiations the bank will always 
enter into that process with the business agent first. This is intuitive since the advantage 
over the outside investors is the collection power which will be used in the negotiation. 
If the negotiation with the business agent has already happened than this advantage is 
worthless. The negotiation process between bank and outside investors is similar to the 
above mentioned:37 
1. Cut the intermediary out and negotiate with the business agent (loss of 
value due to lack of information).38 
2. Except the offer from the bank.39 
3. Negotiate who will get into the negotiation process with the business 
agent.40 
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Both profit from a 50:50 distribution of any additional gains due to the information 
advantage.41 
As mentioned above if the refinancing is done via deposits than a renegotiation is not 
possible without triggering a bank run. The alternatives a depositor has got are the 
following. 42 
1. Except the new offer.43 
2. Trying to collect the full amount of his deposit = inducing  a bank run, 
 entering into a negotiation process and trying to avoid a bank run.44 
The second scenario can result in a squeeze out of the bank, which directly engages 
the business agent and the depositor in a dialogue.45 
Since any attempt of the bank to change the original commitments to depositors will 
lead to a bank run and therefore, will reduce a bank’s profit to zero, renegotiation is not 
an option for the respective bank. The bank will forgo gains and only depositors profit 
from any additional surplus.46 
Therefore, a banker who seeks for outside investors in t=1 will promise those 
depositors a full repayment to avoid a bank run. Moreover, in order to avoid 
disintermediation which would result in outside investors’ and business agents’ direct 
negotiations, bankers do not extract rents from depositors. In fact they just act as transit 
station where all gains are distributed to the depositors. Their role in the economy is still 
valid. They are able to collect a higher amount of money from the business agent for the 
outside investors. This ability is important because it creates liquidity since the 
information advantage makes it possible to lend and collect a higher loan.47  
From the above outlined characteristics of investors it can be seen that the optimal 
bank capital structure consists of deposits and equity. In this new game a banker who is 
withholding his skill at t=2 has a good bargaining position but only against the equity 
holders.  From the descriptions above the possible outcomes of the game can be easily 
derived. There can be only two states: either the amount of deposits outstanding is 
higher or lower than the agreed repayment or banker’s collection value. As already 
mentioned the depositors who feel threatened that their money is in danger will trigger a 
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bank run which is the case when the available amount does not cover the outstanding 
deposits. Is the agreed repayment or banker’s collection value met than there is no bank 
run. The gains of equity holders and the banker do depend on the amount of repayment, 
the banker’s collection value and the sum that the equity holders can collect without the 
banker’s help. Given that the depositors get paid first, the money left over can be 
distributed among the other players of this game. In the case of a smaller repayment 
than the amount equity holders would be able to collect, the banker’s help is not needed 
and therefore, he is disintermediated. In the event of the banker’s collection being 
higher than the repayment and the repayment is bigger than the amount collectable by 
the equity holders the gains after satisfying the depositors is distributed the following 
way: the equity holders get the amount that they would have been able to collect 
themselves plus half of the gains made due to the skills of the banker and the banker 
gets half of these additional gains too. The gains derive from the difference between 
repayment and the collectable amount of equity holders. The last possibility is the 
repayment being bigger than the amount collectable by the skilled banker. In this case, 
that after the distribution to the depositors the equity holders get the amount they would 
have been able to collect themselves and half of the gains. The banker gets half of the 
gains too and the gains are derived from the banker’s skilled loan collection minus the 
amount the equity holders would have gotten without the banker’s engagement.48 
It can be seen from the above statements that the gains of the banker does depend on 
the amount of deposits chosen at t=1. The higher the amount of deposits issued the less 
rent is possible for the banker, in the worst case the gains might even be zero if a bank 
run has been triggered. Therefore, the banker has a fierce interest to keep the deposits 
low in order to realise the maximum gains possible for him. The optimal capital 
structure is found after trading off the costs of a bank run in a bust with the rent to 
bankers in a boom. Therefore, the optimal capital structure is characterised by relatively 
more deposits when a boom is expected since than depositors do feel safer and 
relatively less deposits when a bust is feared. Additionally, the liquidity of assets does 
influence the capital structure. It is argued that higher illiquidity calls for a more robust 
capital structure which can be achieved by issuing equity. Last, the collateral of the loan 
has an impact on the capital structure too since its risk and the risk of the loan is 
correlated. It can be compared to the observed risk shifting problem in firms.49 
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2.2.2.2 Multiple Period Lending Model 
In this case, there are projects involved that last throughout two periods meaning that 
they do not mature before t=2. In general, it seems to be quite intuitive that a banker has 
to pay his depositors in t=1 in order to avoid a bank run. The amount that needs to be 
paid is the amount of deposits outstanding. Furthermore, the money he can distribute 
depends on the amount that the business agent will pay him in t=1 and how much he can 
borrow from outside investors in exchange for future promises in t=2.50 
In time=1 the possible solutions of the game are the following: 
1.  If deposits are higher than the liquidation value and the business agent 
refuses to pay than there is a bank run. Depositors will directly seize the 
money, which will be less than the banker could have collected. Bankers 
and equity holders will get nothing.51 
2.  It is assumed that deposits are not higher than risky or safe deposits or the 
liquidation value. Furthermore, in this scenario the value of safe and risky 
deposits is higher than the liquidation value. This leads to a loss of the 
banker’s bargaining power. If the risky deposits are higher than the safe 
the deposits than at a certain point the ability of the banker to collect the 
liquidation value will fall to the value of risky deposits in t=2. However, if 
the risky deposits are smaller than the deposits of t=1 do not influence 
future payoffs.52 
3.  Again, it is assumed that deposits are not higher than risky or safe deposits 
or the liquidation value. In this scenario risky deposits are smaller than 
safe deposits and they are smaller than the liquidation value. Now, the 
banker can use his liquidation threat. If the amount of deposits held in t=1 
exceeds the optimal amount of deposits than liquidation in t=1 is a 
possibility, especially if the business agent pays less than what can be 
received via liquidation.53 In the event that the liquidation value in t=1 is 
higher than the expected returns from the project in t=2 than the banker is 
able to make higher gains than the actual liquidation value of t=1. 
Additionally, the actual deposits are higher than the optimal amount. The 
business agent will be forced to pay more. This can increase up to the 
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optimal amount that he needs to pay in order to avoid liquidation. At that 
point the additional benefits for the banker decline.54 
Is the situation vice versa (the liquidation value today is less than the future promises 
in t=2) than it is similar if the actual deposits exceed the optimal amount of deposits. 
However, if the amount paid by the business agent is bigger than the promised one than 
it can be possible that the banker only realises the liquidation value of t=1.55 
4. If the safe deposits are smaller than the risky deposits and they are smaller than the 
liquidation value in t=1, independence between bank rents and capital structure is 
created. This is only true under the assumption that the expected liquidation value of t=2 
(depending on t=1) is smaller than the liquidation value of t=1. In the case that, this 
equation is the other way round, then the banker can gain less than the expected 
liquidation value.56 
In t=0 the banker tries to maximise his profits over the following two periods. Under 
competition and under the assumption that a banker does not have any own funds, the 
following can be derived. If risky deposits are higher than the amount that is needed to 
be financed and this amount is higher than safe deposits than the banker can be cut out. 
There is no need for a banker since the project can be financed without a costly 
intermediary. However, if the situation is different meaning that safe deposit exceed the 
financing amount and risky deposits are smaller than the financing amount than a 
banker is valuable. He will use deposits and equity to finance the project and for his 
service he will get some remuneration. Nevertheless, if he has money of his own than 
the amount of deposits in t=1 depends on how much the business agent will pay and the 
probability of a bank run, which becomes a higher threat, the higher the amount of 
deposits. This indicates that a bank with a higher amount of deposits might be better off 
lending to an entrepreneur, who is not going to produce high rents in t=1. However, an 
entrepreneur how knows that he will receive a high cash inflow in t=1 will prefer a well 
capitalised bank. Why? Because he does not want to take the risk to be liquidated in t=1 
which can be the case if the bank is highly levered and can not wait for the money to be 
returned in t=2. This indicates that every bank has its own clientele.57  
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Diamond and Rajan (2000) also explain the case in which a bank has lent money to 
various borrowers. It is assumed that the borrowers are small and their liquidation 
values are the same. However, the respective rents do differ among them. It seems to be 
intuitive that all business agents will make an offer to the banker just high enough to 
avoid liquidation. If the sum of these offers is sufficient to cover the deposits that need 
to be paid back in t=1 than there is no overpayment. Nevertheless, if that is not the case 
than business agents have to raise their offer or some might even get liquidated so that 
the banker is able to pay his obligations. Again, the banker is the one who can accept an 
offer or liquidate the project. However, liquidation is not free and the costs are the 
forgone future rents in t=2, net of the amount the banker receives in the event of selling 
the project. On the other hand, the benefits of liquidation are the gain in t=1 minus the 
sum that the banker is able to pledge at this moment. The cost and benefits expressed in 
a ratio indicate that the banker, who is forced to sell some projects, has an incentive to 
sell off borrowers whose ratio is the lowest. The business agents are aware of that 
behaviour and they try to provide the banker with as much as possible in t=1 that can be 
used to attract outside financing. This increases their denominator of the ratio. It can be 
seen that more cash rich business agents have to offer less money in relation to agents 
who are short of liquidity. Furthermore, bankers do not explicitly ask for more money 
from the agents, but agents are aware of the problem and offer more in the first place.58 
 
2.3 The optimal Capital Structure under Market Conditions 
Competition) 
2.3.1 The Theory 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2006) have come up with the following theory, in order 
to explain why legal requirements do not define capital ratios. In a situation where the 
good projects are scarce banks need to compete for the few profitable projects available. 
Monitoring is an important asset for firms when there is a significant information 
asymmetry. In the case described, banks have two monitoring incentives: first, the fact 
that they are required to hold equity and second, their interest in the loan being repaid at 
maturity, which goes a long with a higher interest rate since monitoring is costly. 
Higher capital is preferred by borrowers but implies higher costs for banks which, 
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therefore, have higher interest rates as monitoring incentive. So in a competitive state 
banks need to have at least some amount of capital in order to attract borrowers with 
profitable projects. The exact number depends on the return of the project and the cost 
of capital. For example, in a situation where returns are low and capital is relatively 
cheap, a bank would raise the maximum amount of capital but would not monitor at its 
maximal capacity. Another surprising finding has been that borrowers are willing to 
shift some of their profits to the banks in form of higher loan rates in order to give them 
an incentive to increase the monitoring. In a competitive environment the interest rate is 
set by the market forces, the regulation body would want to set a minimum capital 
requirement in order to assure that banks comply with their monitoring duties. This 
compulsory amount of equity would be higher than the one in the scenario with an 
oversupply of profitable projects. This is due to the fact that when the amount of 
profitable projects is low than the market determines a lower loan rate. Therefore, in 
order to make sure that banks do have a monitoring incentive the level of required 
capital must be elevated.59  
Socially optimal and therefore, required by the regulators is bank finance by deposits 
when the costs of equity are high. In the case of costs of deposits and equity being 
similar it is preferred to use equity finance since not all costs are included in the costs of 
deposits. If the cost difference is very high it is better to finance by deposits. The market 
might lead to other financing proposals. In the case of an oversupply of bank funds, it is 
suggested to hold more capital than required by law. There might be even more capital 
accumulated than socially beneficial. This is done, as above mentioned, to attract 
profitable projects. It can be seen that the effect of regulation on the capital ratio does 
depend on the market situation. In case of an excessive supply of projects, banks would 
prefer to hold no capital so regulation does increase the level of capital held. In the 
situation where banks have to compete for borrowers the amount of capital might be 
higher than required and even at a socially non beneficial level. Regulatory could 
improve this situation by introducing a cap on capital held.60  
 
2.3.2 The Empirical Evidence 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010) take the theory of Allen et al. to a test. They want to 
analyse if competition, as explained above, does have an influence on the bank capital 
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ratio. Their sample consists of European commercial, cooperative and savings banks 
over the period of 1999-2005. 2,600 banks situated in 10 different countries are 
explored.61 At the beginning they only analyse commercial banks. This is done because 
profit is taken as variable to capture success and commercial banks are the only kinds 
that operate under the profit making condition. However, this has major drawbacks: 
first, losing a high percentage of the sample under scrutiny, second, being able to apply 
the outcome to the major European banks and third, not following the way literature has 
taken so far. The outcome shows that commercial banks do indeed hold a higher amount 
of capital in a competitive environment.62 Conducting the same analyses with all three 
kinds of banks together (commercial, savings, cooperative) does not change the 
qualitative results as discovered before. The positive relationship between capital buffer 
and competition gets even more significant.63 
 
Meh and Moran (2009) test their findings of an increased capital- asset ratio during an 
event of shock with actual data from the U.S. banking system. It turns out that the 
model is in accordance with the data which can lead to the conclusion that the factor 
market is important when it comes to defining the amount of capital held by banks.64 
 
2.4 The optimal Capital Structure and deposit insurance 
Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000) argue that equity is necessary in order to prevent 
banks from runs. They point out that on the contrary to common believe deposit 
insurance by the government is not needed when the amount of equity held by banks is 
high enough. When the bank capital held is not sufficient than no run must be triggered, 
it can just mean that the deposits are no longer fully insured.65 
The basic paper on bank runs is written by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). They create a 
two period model in which the interest rate is lower in case depositors want their money 
back after the first period. Since leaving the money for two periods guarantees a higher 
interest rate, this setup acts as insurance. Furthermore, in cases without government 
insurance banks can face a bank run. This means that lots of depositors want to 
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withdraw their money after one period. The worst case scenario can be prevented by 
government insurance, which could lead to actions of the government in an event of a 
bank run. Such a measure could be, for example, tax all the withdrawing depositors. 
This gives an incentive to leave the money with the bank for a longer period of time and 
therefore, prevents the economy from losses.66 
Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000) assume that in their model all participants must 
invest their money within the bank. Furthermore, they say that the attitude towards the 
kind of investment (equity or deposits) depends on the risk aversion. Deposits are suited 
for risk avers people, whereas an investment in equity reflects a risk neutral behaviour. 
Additionally, the authors assume that any contract is legally binding and can be 
enforced if necessary.67 
The model consists of three events along a timeline and two kinds of investors, the 
risk neutral and the risk avers ones. The information about the investment horizon (one 
or two periods) is private. The interest rate for the shorter period is lower compared to 
the longer period. The investors could prefer investing the money for the full time 
period but than they face the problem that they are unsure if they will get their money 
back in the second period since there is no insurance.68 
The bank can finance itself either through deposits or through shares. Shares are 
residual claim products and can not be sold at t=1, they must be kept until the end of the 
whole model. However, dividends for shareholders are possible in any period. The 
authors decide to conduct their analyses in a competitive environment which results in 
non-profit making banks. In order to avoid a bank run investors do need an advantage to 
let their money in the bank over two periods. Therefore, they must be sure that they will 
get the money back in the later period and the interest rate must be higher for the long 
term investment. The bank’s investment will only be paid out in period 2. In period 1 
the bank must be able to give the deposits back that were only invested for one year and 
to pay the promised dividends on the equity.69 Now, the authors assume that there will 
be no bank run since the two period investors believe that they will get their money 
back by the end of period 2. In period 1 short term investors will withdraw their money. 
They will be left with cash and assets with returns in period 2. Since they are not 
interested in any long term holdings they will put those assets on the market for long 
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term investors. Under the above stated assumption, that shares can not be traded in 
period 1, it turns out that deposit insurance without government is possible. Therefore, 
the bank’s liability must be unconstraint. This is the case when there is enough risk 
neutral capital – this is equity. The amount of risk neutral capital is driven by the 
relationship of investors with different risk attitude and by the availability of deposits 
and equity per investor.70 Last, Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000) look at what will 
happen when the amount of risk neutral capital is not enough. They add a new 
assumption. In period 1 it is possible to “allow the banks to suspend convertibility (of 
deposits) if they want to”71. The authors find that insufficient capital must not 
necessarily lead to a bank run. In their paper they proof that it might just mean that 
deposits are not longer totally, but still partially, insured.72 
Gangopadhyay and Singh (2000) suggest that according to their model government 
insurance is not necessary since there is enough capital to guarantee depositors 
insurance. The only condition that needs to be met is that banks do operate in a 
competitive environment.73  
 
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2006) find similar results in their model of credit market 
competition. In the absence of insurance, depositors demand a higher return, if they face 
higher risks. In other words, the return should reflect the risk.74 Analysing the banks’ 
behaviour under the assumption that there is no deposit insurance and a higher supply of 
funds than profitable projects leads to similar results. Banks would have higher capital 
ratios than required due to the market competition. However, there is a difference when 
it comes to holding capital in case of excessive funds. Now, banks might have an 
interest in holding at least some capital for signalling purposes. This means that banks 
want to attract depositors with a higher capital ratio and showing that they will be 
monitoring. Again, this could lead depositors to decrease the costs on the deposits and 
therefore, cut their overall finance costs. This is most effective when the costs of 
deposits do reflect the risks associated with it. In the case where there is a shortage of 
funds and a risk-shifting problem, which means that banks are willing to take on 
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projects with higher risk and higher return on the expense of creditors, the results are the 
same.75 
 
2.5 The optimal Capital Structure and Liquidity 
Another extension of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is the introduction of checking 
accounts and debit cards. However, in these analyses deposit insurance is included in 
the model. It points out that value is created when a client can pay by check or debit 
card. Nevertheless, this only happens when the check can be cashed, meaning that the 
bank has sufficient cash funds to do so. The authors apply their model to two different 
kinds of banks: unified systems and separated systems. The first is less vulnerable to 
bank runs triggered by panicking investors but shocks still affect it. Additionally, 
unified system banks can either choose to hold a lot of cash or invest the money in 
funds that yield higher rents. The later, however, are subject to bank runs and therefore, 
need to hold a lot of cash in order to be able to serve withdrawing investors. It is 
intuitive that this can lead to an overinvestment in cash or cash equivalent assets.76 
The authors find that unified banks do create more value with hindsight. However, it 
turns out, that the separate banks provide more stability in the event of a panic that 
causes a bank run. Yet, the above assumption about overinvestment into liquidity turns 
out to be correct. This is the way how the separate bank or restricted bank protects itself 
against impatient clients (clients who will not let their money with the bank for two 
periods but will demand the deposit back after only one). This finding makes the 
restricted not look good since the unified bank is able to avoid bank runs without large 
buffers of liquid assets. Furthermore, large quantities of liquidity are not beneficial 
because they create bank runs caused by different shocks. This can be so called shocks 
from the outside environment.77. 
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2.6 The Determinants of Capital Structure – Empirical Evidence 
2.6.1 Data 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) conduct regression analyses with the 100 largest US 
bank holding companies in order to find out effects on the capital ratio called 
“MKTRAT”78 which is common equity to total assets calculated in market values.79 
Furthermore, the authors adjust their model for effects on the capital ratio that can 
appear due to changes in a company’s share price.80 Stock price effects are not actively 
neutralised, but gone after one year. Testing the regression by adding a constraint that 
does not allow “MKTRAT”81 to be influenced by changes in the stock prices leads to 
similar results. Adjusting the original regression in a way that only allows having the 
optimal capital ratio leads to the same findings. It still can be seen that the capital ratio 
increases in the later years.82 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) analyse the determinants of bank capital on German banks. 
When talking about banks they differ between savings banks, cooperative banks and all 
other banks. According to them, this is important because these banks have different 
possibilities or constraints due to their ownerships or the environments they are 
operating in. Therefore, their banks’ capital might not be influenced by the same 
determinates or at least not in the same direction. Savings banks for example are owned 
by the state and their access to the capital market is constrained. Therefore, they highly 
depend on profits in order to build up equity. Cooperative banks are less restricted since 
they are owned by cooperative members. However, they only operate in a regional 
environment. All other banks are characterised by better access to the capital markets 
and a more diversified portfolio, since they can operate worldwide.83 They use 
unconsolidated balance sheets and profit and loss statements of German banks that have 
been collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The sample period is from 1992 to 2001.84 
Bank capital is measures in two ways: one “as equity capital from the balance sheet 
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over total assets (CAP1)”85 and the other as “total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2)86, 
called “(CAP2)” 87.88 
 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) test how risk management influences the capital 
structure of banks. Therefore, they look at the loan buying and selling behaviour of a 
bank. Furthermore, they also check if that behaviour has any influence on the lending of 
the respective bank.89 The sample consists of US commercial banks and their loan 
selling and buying behaviour over the period of June 1987 to 1993 (end). The data has 
been available on a quarterly basis.90 The authors define their capital variable as 
“Capital/Risky assets = Book value of equity/(Total assets − Cash − Fed funds sold – 
Securities)“91. Right from the beginning it can be seen, only by looking at the 
characteristics of different subsamples that, banks that seem to actively manage their 
risks are better off. It means that banks that are selling and buying loans do have lower 
capital buffers and simultaneously their liquidity ratios are lower. However, it looks as 
if they are also engaged in most of the high risk loan activities. Furthermore, it is 
discovered that these banks have a higher chance of using interest-derivates.92  
 
Brewer III, Kaufmann and Wall (2008) try to find out why the capital ratios across 
countries differ, even though, the capital requirements are the same.93 The sample is 
derived from bankscope and includes data from 1992 to 2005. They take the 150 biggest 
banks as they have been ranked in The Banker for the respective years under scrutiny. 
The banks have their head office in 12 different countries. Furthermore, the banks are 
commercial or bank holding companies. The sample does not contain cooperative banks 
or banks in which the government holds a significant stake in. In the end, they operate 
with a group that consists of 78 banks every one has been at least included in one of the 
years under observation.94 The capital ratio is measured in two different ways. First, it is 
derived by the “ratio of a banking organization’s book value equity to the banking 
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organization’s book value total on-balance sheet assets”95. Second, it is calculated as 
“the ratio of a banking organization’s book value Tier 1 capital to the banking 
organization’s book value Basel I risk-weighted on and selected off-balance sheet 
assets”96.97 All in all, the authors find that the bank’s characteristics taken all together 
are significantly responsible for the capital ratios.98 The enhanced basic model (allowing 
for country fixed effects) shows that these country effects, taken all together, help to 
clarify the differences in the capital ratios. The fact that 6 of the 10 tested country 
factors do have a positive relationship with the Tier I capital ratios seems to prove the 
argument above.99 Moreover, both models test macroeconomic factors, which are not 
significant. This can indicate that these are not the only country effects that influence 
the capital ratios. Furthermore, it can be said that international active banks are also 
subject to the macroeconomic variables of their host countries. These receiving 
countries have also an influence on the capital ratios.100  
 
2.6.2 Risk 
The relationship of risk and bank capital can be threefold. For banks that have high 
bank capital ratios it is expected to be positive. The more risk they have the more capital 
is taken on. Banks with a low ratio experience a negative relationship. The less capital 
they have the more risky is the bank and the more capital they need in order to make up 
for the risk. Therefore, these banks can try to meet the minimum capital structure by 
reducing their risk. However, banks that have significantly high capital ratios should not 
be affected at all. In this case the capital buffer theory is expected to be inapplicable.101 
 
In order to better identify the influence of risk on the capital ratio, Flannery and 
Rangan (2008) split the period under observation into four blocks. These periods are 
chosen due to regulation changes within these years. The research period is divided into 
the following blocks: 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997 and 1998-2001.102 Risk is 
measured as asset volatility, which is calculated as suggest by Ronn and Verma (1986). 
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The findings of risk’s influence on the capital ratio are twofold significant. From 1986-
1993 risk is negatively correlated (at a 5% level of significance), which is not intuitive, 
since a higher capital ratio should actually compensate for higher risk. On the contrary, 
in the other two periods risk has a positive and significant (1% level) relationship with 
capital.103 Introducing a constraint that does not allow “MKTRAT” 104 to be influenced 
by stock price changes leads to the following results. Risk is still negatively correlated 
in the first two time blocks (earlier period at a 1% significance level and later period at 
5%) followed by a positive correlation in the other periods (both results are significant 
at 1%). However, the effect can no longer be described as monotonically rising. 
Adjusting the regression one last time in a way that the wanted market equity ratio is 
always met does not change the outcome. 105 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) define bank risk as “risk-weighted on-balance-sheet assets 
over total assets”106. The authors find a significantly positive relationship only for 
savings banks, using “CAP1”107 as dependent variable. Furthermore, their results 
confirm the theory mentioned above because the relationship is insignificant for 
cooperative and all other banks. However, when looking at banks that have a high but 
not significantly high capital ratio the relationship becomes significantly positive. 
Combining regulatory pressure and risk leads to negative correlations but the results are 
insignificant. Generally spoken it would mean that under regulatory pressure and 
holding less capital the impact on bank capital is negative. This is true for both forms of 
dependent variables.108  
 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) call their measurement risk management. They find 
out that banks that actually manage their assets by buying and selling loans have smaller 
“capital-to-risky assets”109 ratios. Moreover, the results are significant. The authors take 
it even one step further by declaring that banks that participate in selling and buying 
have lower ratios compared to banks that adjust their assets only by selling loans. The 
findings are again significant.110 Another finding is that the more risk managing is 
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involved the higher is the investment in loans that are qualified as high risk loans.111 
The results show that these selling and buying loan banks have more commercial and 
industry loans on their books. Again, the ratio is not so high for banks that only engage 
in selling loans. Only one year in the sample lacks of statistic significance. The same 
qualitative findings are reported for commercial real estate lending behaviour. 112 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) also assume that the closer a bank watches and manages 
its assets and therefore, its credit risk, the less capital needs to be held. This assumption 
is proven to be valid. The managing activity is 8% of total loans on average and inflows 
and outflows seem to be cancelling each other out.113 
In order to rule out reverse causality the authors conduct some more test. They find 
that competition in the loan selling and buying business depresses the capital-risky asset 
ratio. Furthermore, in an environment where the competition is not simultaneously 
engaged in both risk management activities, leads banks to hold more liquid assets 
similar qualitative effects turn out to be also true for lending. Furthermore, in the case 
where competition is engaged in the risk managing market banks have more loans on 
their books. This is true for commercial and industry as well as for real estate loans. The 
results have the same quality for both “multi-bank and multi-state BHCs” 114. The only 
difference lays in the coefficients which turn out to be higher in the multi-state BHCs.115 
 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) do not talk about asset risk but bank risk. This 
variable is defined as “dividing a banking organization’s Basel I risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) by its total on-balance sheet assets”116. In their analyses the result is also 
twofold. On the one hand, the relationship is positive with the leverage ratio and on the 
other it is negative with the Tier I capital ratio. Moreover, both results are significant.117 
The quality of the above results does not change even when extending the basic model 
with country fixed variables.118 The qualitative relationship of both capital ratios is still 
valid in the model including regulatory factors. Both correlations are significant.119 
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Table 1: The influence of risk on the equity ratio  
 Relationship Significance 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) − / + yes, at 5% - 10% / 1% 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + yes, at 1% 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) −   yes, at 5% 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008)  
+ / −  yes,  at 1% - 5% / 1%, 10% 
Adapted from: Flannery and Rangan (2008) p.416-417; Kleff and Weber (2008) p.368; Cebenoyan and 
Strahan (2004) p.32-35; Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) p.19-22 
 
2.6.3 Charter Value 
In theory, the charter value is highly important to banks. Therefore, banks are willing 
to take on less risk or debt on their balance sheets.120  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) do indeed reveal that the charter value and the bank 
capital ratio are positively related. These findings are significant. Moreover, this is true 
for all three regressions (basic, no stock price effects, obtained equity ratio over 
time).121 
 
Table 2: The influence of the charter value on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Flannery and Rangan (2008)  +  yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Flannery and Rangan (2008) p.416 
 
2.6.4 Profitability 
Profitability indicates the ability of a bank to build up equity through internal reserves. 
Therefore, profitability and bank capital are expected to be positively related. This 
behaviour actually is predicted by the Pecking Order Theory.122  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) measure profitability as “Ratio of net operating income 
to book value of total assets”123. They find a positive and highly significant relationship 
between that variable and bank capital.124 
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Furthermore, Kleff and Weber (2008) expect profitability to be highly valued by 
savings banks since it is their first resource of generating equity.125 As measure for 
profitability they use ROA, which is calculated the following way: “annual net profit, 
net of provisions and after taxes divided by total assets.”126 As predicted the 
profitability and bank capital is positively and significantly related for savings and 
cooperative banks. However, it is not significant for other banks. This is true for both 
capital ratios.127 
 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) conduct their analyses with the variable called 
profitability. They find a positive correlation with both capital ratios. However, there is 
a difference as far as the significance is concerned: the “Tier 1 capital ratio” 128 turns out 
to be significant at 5%, whereas the result for the leverage ratio only shows significance 
at 10%.129  Introducing country fixed effects into the basic model does not change the 
direction of the relationships between capital and profits. However, the results lose their 
significance.130 Including regulatory variables in the regression does not change the 
quality of the findings above.131 
 
Table 3: The influence of profitability on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) + yes, at 1% 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + yes, at 1% 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008)  
+ yes, at 5% - 10% 
Adapted from: Flannery and Rangan (2008) p.416; Kleff and Weber (2008) p.366-367, 369; Brewer III, 
Kaufman and Wall (2008) p.21-22 
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2.6.5 Size 
Larger banks are assumed to have lower capital ratios because they have easier access 
to the various methods of funding.132 Furthermore, larger banks have the advantage of 
holding a more diversified portfolio which can decrease the bank capital even further. 
Moreover, fixed direct bankruptcy costs weigh less heavily on larger banks.133 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) define size as “natural logarithm of total assets”134. The 
relationship is significantly negative, which means the bigger a company the lower is 
the capital ratio. This is true for the basic regression.135 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) find different results depending on which kind of bank the 
attention is drawn to. Size is calculated the following way: “natural log of total 
assets”136. Savings banks do experience a significant and positive relationship. On the 
contrary, other banks show a significantly negative relationship. This is true for both 
dependent equity ratio variables.137 
 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) discover in their analyses that larger banks hold indeed 
less capital. They use the better access to capital markets as the main argument to 
explain that phenomenon.138  
 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) find in their analyses similar results. The 
relationship between size and capital ratio is negative. This is valid, independent of how 
the authors define the capital ratio. However, the “Tier 1 capital ratio” 139 does not show 
a significant relationship.140 Adding country fixed effects to the basic model does not 
change the effect that size has on the capital ratios. Moreover, the relationship between 
“Tier 1 capital” 141 and size has become significant in those analyses.142 In their model 
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which also includes regulatory factors the qualitative findings do not change and are 
still significant.143 
 
Table 4: The influence of size on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) − yes, at 1% 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + / − yes, at 1% / 1% 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) − 
yes, at 5% but the absolute 
amount decreases with size 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008) 
− yes, at 1% - 5% 
Adapted from: Flannery and Rangan (2008) p.416; Kleff and Weber (2008) p.369; Cebenoyan and 
Strahan (2004) p.27; Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) p.20-22 
 
2.6.6 Regulatory Pressure 
This variable is assumed to show a positive relationship with the bank capital ratio. 
The higher the pressure the higher should be the ratio.144 Moreover, not being able to 
meet the minimum bank capital comes at a cost which banks try to avoid.145 
 
Therefore, Flannery and Rangan (2008) define a dummy variable. The variable is one 
when the “BHC’s book equity capital lies within 1.5% of mandated minimum value, 
and zero otherwise.”146 However, the results indicate that regulation does not have an 
influence on bank capital.147 
 
Additionally, Kleff and Weber (2008) also define a dummy variable. It is “based on 
lagged capital and equals unity if the ratio of capital over risk-weighted assets is within 
one standard deviation of a certain threshold and zero otherwise.”148 The threshold is 
defined as 25 percentile of the least capitalised bank in Germany.149 For savings and 
cooperative banks the findings are not significant if the dependent variable is defined as 
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“CAP1” 150. However, taking “CAP2” 151 as dependent variable reveals significantly 
positive results.152 
 
Table 5: The influence of regulatory pressure on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) − No 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + yes, at 1% - 5% 
Adapted from: Flannery and Rangan (2008) p.416; Kleff and Weber (2008) p.368 
 
2.6.7 Deposits from non-bank customers 
This can be a variable to measure competition. Non-bank deposits are longed for by 
banks because on these deposits the interest rate is relatively low. For other deposits or 
bank deposits, banks have to pay a larger interest rate. Theory suggests that the higher 
the bank deposit ratio “(BDR)” 153 the higher the bank capital. This is due to the fact that 
if a bank already has lots of different depositors they can even find more new 
depositors.154 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) calculate the variable as follows “ratio of all liabilities to non-
bank customers10 divided by total assets”155. They find that all other banks’ bank capital 
ratios are highly negatively correlated. Heterogeneity can cause this result because 
banks, which serve only small markets, tend to have less customer deposits which they 
try to compensate with higher bank capital ratios. Therefore, when adjusted for high 
capital ratios the relationship becomes less strong. Additionally, Kleff and Weber 
(2008) find that bank capital of cooperative banks is significantly positive related. This 
seems intuitive since the variable deposits from non-banks is one of their main sources 
of financing. The highly significant results come from the “CAP1” 156 regression.157 
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Table 6: The influence of deposits from non-bank customers on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Kleff and Weber (2008) − / + yes, at 1% - 5% / 1% - 10% 
Adapted from: Kleff and Weber (2008) p.369 
 
2.6.8 Loan Loss Provisions 
Provisions can be considered as an indicator for portfolio risk. Moreover, they show in 
what shape a bank is. Therefore, a negative correlation with bank capital can mean that 
an already troubled bank does experience greater difficulties raising new equity. On the 
other hand, a positive correlation can indicate that troubled banks want to compensate 
their misery with higher capital ratios.158 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) define “new loan loss provisions over total assets (PROV)“159 
to represent the variable loan loss provisions.160 They find a significant and positive 
relationship in all three bank categories and both capital ratios. However, the impact is 
especially severe for savings and cooperative banks. They seem to build a higher capital 
buffer, which means that they are taking on additional capital in excess to what is 
required by law.161 
 
Table 7: The influence of loan loss provisions on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + yes, at 1% - 10%  
Adapted from: Kleff and Weber (2008) p.369;  
 
2.6.9 Mergers 
In Germany, mergers have been quite common for banks. Since mergers can 
obviously change the bank capital ratio, mergers need to be considered.162 
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Kleff and Weber (2008) define a dummy variable in order to capture the effects of 
mergers. The variable is one when the bank has been involved in a merger, more 
specific, if the bank has been the acquirer.163 The results are weak. Savings and other 
banks seem to experience a significant positive relationship for both capital ratios. 
However, there can not be drawn any conclusion of how mergers exactly do influence 
the bank capital ratio.164 
 
Table 8: The influence of mergers on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Kleff and Weber (2008) + yes, at 1% - 10%  
Adapted from: Kleff and Weber (2008) p.370 
 
2.6.10 Ownership 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) test if the amount of capital held does depend on the 
ownership, more precisely they want to find out if “BHC affiliation”165 influences the 
capital. The authors find that the relationship is negative and significant. However, in 
cases where the bank is related to bank holding companies in different states the 
correlation is positive and also highly significant. They explain this by the fact that the 
more states are involved the more regulations are applied to the bank and therefore, it 
might have to hold a higher amount of capital.166 
 
Furthermore, the influence of ownership is discussed in this paper, whenever the 
results are split up according to the different types of banks (savings, cooperative, etc). 
 
Table 9: The influence of ownership on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) − / + yes, at 5% for both 
Adapted: Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) p.27 
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2.6.11 Economic cycle 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) test in their model the relationship between 
capital ratios and different GDP variables. They do discover a positive correlation 
between real change in GDP and capital ratios. However, the results do not show any 
significance.167 
 
Table 10: The influence of the economic cycle on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008) 
+ No 
Adapted from: Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) p.21 
 
2.6.12 Importance of Banks for the Environment  
A less friendly environment for possible bailouts, accompanied by less “federal 
safety”168 (deposit insurance) could motivate banks to take on more equity.169  
 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) define a variable as “The extent to which a 
country’s financial system is bank-based (BANK) is estimated by taking the total assets 
of the banking system divided by the country’s gross domestic product”170. The 
relationship with capital ratios is negative and significant.171 Adding regulatory factors 
into the regression does not change that direction. However, this time the significance is 
only given for the leverage ratio.172 The model with regulatory variables only reveals 
insignificant results.173 
 
Table 11: The influence of importance of banks for the environment on the equity ratio 
 Relationship Significance 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008) 
− yes, at 10% 
Adapted from: Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) p.22 
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2.7 The Determinants of Liabilities – Empirical Evidence 
2.7.1 Data 
All the analyses of Gropp and Heider (2010) are based on a sample consisting of “the 
200 largest publicly traded banks in the United States and 15 EU countries from 1991 to 
2004”174. They perform regressions with different dependent variables for leverage: one 
variable is defined as “one minus the ratio of equity over assets in market values”175 and 
another is derived the same way but in book values.176 The authors run the regressions 
in which the dependent variable (the leverage) is split up in deposits and non-deposits, 
because they want to know which factors influence the amount of deposits held. This is 
done by calculating both market and book values.177 The book value of deposits is 
defined as “total deposits/book value of assets”178 and the market value as “total 
deposits/market value of assets”179. 180 
 
2.7.2 Risk 
Gropp and Heider (2010) find in their regressions for both market and book value 
leverage a negative relationship. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.181 
Controlling for banks’ fixed effects does not change the strong and negative correlation. 
Furthermore, when looking at the decomposed leverage regressions it can be seen that 
risk and non-deposit liabilities and deposits are negatively related for both market and 
book values. However, none of these findings are significant.182  
 
Table 12: The influence of risk on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) − yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.605-606 
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2.7.3 Profitability 
Gropp and Heider (2010) reveal a negative and highly significant relationship between 
profits and leverage (measured in book values as well as in market values).183 The 
results are consistent with the regression that includes banks’ fixed effects.184 Looking 
at the influence of profits on non-deposit liabilities shows a highly positive correlation 
for both market and book values. These results are significant at the 1% level. The 
relationship is exactly the other way for deposits.185 
 
Table 13: The influence of profitability on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) − / + yes, at 1% / 1% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.605-606 
 
2.7.4 Size 
The regressions for both market and book values of leverage show a positive 
relationship. Moreover, the significance is 1%.186 Taking banks’ fixed effects into 
account reduces the significance for the market leverage to only 5% and for the book 
leverage all the significance is gone.187 Furthermore, using deposits as dependent 
variable reveals a highly significantly negative relationship. Again, the results are vice 
versa for the non-deposit liabilities. This means that larger banks are less financed with 
deposits.188 
 
Table 14: The influence of size on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) + / − yes, at 1% - 5% / 1% - 5% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.597-599, 605-607 
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2.7.5 Collateral 
The advantage of banks is the fact that they enlarge the amount of collateral available. 
The outside investors are only able to collect parts of the loan which again can be used 
as collateral. The ability of the banker to increase that value enables to raise a higher 
amount of loan that serves as collateral.189 
 
The studies of Gropp and Heider (2010) indicate a positive relation between liabilities 
and collateral. The significance is with 5% higher for the market leverage and lower for 
the book leverage (10%).190 The addition of banks’ fixed effects into the regressions 
results in a total loss of significance for both measures of leverage.191 Furthermore, the 
deposits are negatively related with the leverage. This is true for market and book 
values but only the market leverage shows a low significance at the 10% level. The non-
deposit liabilities are again equipped with the opposite sign and significant at the 10% 
level in both cases. Therefore, it can be assumed that banks with more collateral are 
more likely to be financed with deposits.192 
 
Table 15: The influence of collateral on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) + / − yes, at 5% -10% / 10% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.605 
 
2.7.6 Dividends 
The variable dividends is negatively related with book and market leverage. The 
findings in the study of Gropp and Heider (2010) are significant at a 1% level.193 The 
banks’ fixed effects regression leads to insignificant results.194 Furthermore, deposits 
and non-deposit liabilities experience a negative relationship. However, the results are 
insignificant.195 
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Table 16: The influence of dividends on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) − yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.605, 607 
 
2.7.7 Market-to-Book-ratio 
Gropp and Heider (2010) find a highly significant and negative relationship for that 
variable leverage in book and as well as in market values.196 However, when adding 
bank fixed effects the results are still highly significant but only negative for the market 
leverage.197 Moreover, in market values the variable is highly significant and negatively 
related with deposits and non-deposit liabilities. The relationship for book values is still 
negative but insignificant for both dependent variables.198 
 
Table 17: The influence of Market-to-Book-ratio on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) − yes, at 1% / 1% - 5% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.605, 607 
  
2.7.8 Deposit Insurance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) want to find out what influence deposit insurance has on 
leverage. Deposit insurance is defined in two ways: first, “by per capital deposit 
insurance divided by per capita GDP”199 and second by per capital deposit insurance 
“divided by average deposits per depositor”200.201 The results reveal a positive and 
significant relationship with the market leverage. The significance for the first variable 
is at 5% and even higher for the second one (1%). However, the book leverage does not 
experience any significance for the first variable and only a small significance (10% 
level) for the other variable. Furthermore, when including bank characteristics than 
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there is no more significance of any kind. Therefore, the authors conclude that deposit 
insurance does not influence the liabilities of a bank.202 
 
Table 18: The influence of deposit insurance on leverage 
 Relationship Significance 
Gropp and Heider (2010) + yes, at 1% -10% 
Adapted from: Gropp and Heider (2010) p.610-611 
 
 
3 Bank Capital and Regulation 
 
It is assumed that regulators are driven by the following two reasons: first, it is desired 
to create a stable environment, which means preventing banks from failing and the costs 
that are associated with it and second, regulators try to keep the output balanced since 
lending is crucial in a working economy.203 Furthermore, a minimum required standard 
of capital is assumed to mitigate principal agent problems. The most important one is 
called moral hazard. This event occurs when deposits are insured and therefore, a bank 
is willing to take on excessive risk since it knows that in a bust the depositors are 
protected. These costs of protection are not included in the bank’s calculations.204 
 
3.1 Bank regulation in theory 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) describe the consequences of minimum capital 
requirements in their model as follows. They are talking about “a minimum capital-to-
asset ratio”.205 It is said that more capital is assumed to make a bank more secure in 
respect to bank runs. On the other hand, more capital offers the banker to make higher 
gains since the equity holders can not threaten to start a bank run. The introduction of 
regulations such as prohibition of any new deposits creates the following scenarios. The 
maximum pay out at t=2 is the loan on the banker’s book. However, the new demanding 
rules for capital do not change the banker’s bargaining power which is his ability to sell 
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the borrower’s assets. Therefore, the capital regulations constrict a banker’s actions but 
not his bargaining power.206 Two different outcomes can be observed by “shortening of 
the banker’s horizons”207. Borrowers who do not have much liquidity will be shut down 
by the banker, medium liquid funds are forced to higher payments and clients with 
substantial liquidity face lower payments. In the worst case scenario this can lead to a 
situation in which borrowers, who are low on liquidity and would need cash can not get 
access to funding. The burden is borne by the weaker. Therefore, higher capital 
requirements seem to benefit the substantially liquid borrowers. This is an effect that is 
not intended by the regulator. If the adjustment to higher capital is not made in a decent 
way it can even lead to bank run itself because the depositors that are left over might 
fear that their money is at risk.208 
Capital regulation is important in order to insure that banks hold the optimal amount 
of capital. In a situation where the supply of credit is smaller than the potential 
investment project available banks would prefer not to hold any capital. Only deposits 
are on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet. Furthermore, the interest rate would 
be as high as possible in order to maximize a bank’s profit. A higher interest payment 
motivates a bank to invest relatively more in monitoring. Under the assumption that 
deposit insurance is free its real costs are underestimated. Therefore, regulation would 
increase social welfare by taking into account the external deposit insurance costs by 
forcing banks to hold at least some capital which increases a bank’s interests in 
monitoring. The amount held introduces costs which should not outweigh the positive 
effects such as monitoring and social welfare. So in a situation with a great supply of 
valuable projects regulation’s required amount of equity is higher than the amount that 
would be held in the market equilibrium.209 
 
Dietrich and James (1983) mention another argument why regulation should have an 
influence on capital structure. They talk about a dilemma between shareholders and the 
deposit insurer. In a world with 100 percent deposit insurance, additional capital only 
benefits the insurer since his exposure is better protected. Shareholders, however, would 
prefer to hold less capital in this situation. This could be even less capital than optimal. 
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Therefore, a regulator should exist.210 In an environment without full deposit insurance 
the shareholders’ desire for capital depends on various factors: “the extent of deposit 
insurance coverage, the degree of monopoly power in the bank’s loan market, and the 
effectiveness of deposit rate ceilings on partially insured deposits”211.  
 
3.2 Cyclical behaviour of bank capital and regulation 
Estrella (2004) introduces a dynamic model which indicates that the optimal capital 
does not only vary over time but shows a cyclical pattern. The correlated variables are 
value at risk, external capital flows, net capital changes and the optimal capital.212 
In the model banks try to minimize the following three types of costs: holding, 
bankruptcy and adjustment costs.213 Bank lending and the probability of bank failure do 
have a positive relationship. Furthermore, regulation can have an impact on bank 
lending as well as the overall economic output. In cases in which the regulator defines 
the maximum amount of probability of failure allowed, the following can happen. 
Banks cut their lending activities in order to avoid costs associated with taking on fresh 
capital. Additionally, output might decrease too since it has a positive relationship with 
lending which is again positively correlated with the probability of failure. Regulators 
only tend to influence the output when the associated failing costs get too high. 
Otherwise, no interference would be made. However, there can be situations in with 
regulator’s measures are beneficial. When there is a mispriced situation that would 
motivate banks to increase lending while - at the same time - the disproportionally goes 
up, regulators can again help to establish a social equilibrium. The measures taken by 
regulators can be twofold: either via a maximum amount of allowed probability of 
failure or via defined initial capital and value at risk or via the accounting based rule of 
loan loss concept.214  
The findings of the study are the following: the optimal capital and the value at risk 
concept do have some contradictions. In economic booms the optimal capital can be 
higher than the amount required by the value at risk method. This can lead banks to 
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drop their capital rate or they might use this high rate in order to take on less valuable 
loans.215 
However, in the turndown cycle banks might not meet the minimum required 
standards by value at risk. In order to strengthen their ratios banks can either cut lending 
and, or adjust their liability side. Banks would not opt to get their ratios up by taking on 
new capital since this is too expensive in this model.216 
Estrella (2004) brings the model to a test. Therefore, annual data from US commercial 
banks is used. The sample period lasts from 1984 until 2001. The adjustment costs in 
the model are related to changes in external capital. That leads to the assumption that 
the net external capital does not differ from zero, if than not by much. This is proven 
valid. Moreover, high income can imitate a swap from more costly external to internal 
capital, this effect is also found in the study. However, high losses make it necessary to 
raise additional capital in order to sustain the ratios required. Furthermore, a negative 
relationship between fresh capital issued and net income is assumed. However, net 
income and net change in capital are supposed to reveal a positive correlation. Those 
assumptions turn out to be valid too.217 
All in all, it can be said that in situations where adjustment costs are excluded, optimal 
capital and minimum value at risk requirements paths are similar. Furthermore, value at 
risk can only be used to measure differences in the initial capital and the capital of a 
later period. Including adjustment costs does create the problem of incompatibility 
between value at risk and optimal capital. The change in the optimal capital and the 
value at risk do experience a negative relationship. However, the value at risk and the 
best net fresh non- internally issued capital move in the same direction. Therefore, a 
procyclical relationship is assumed when analysing value at risk and the amount of 
capital.218 
This correlation can be mitigated by introducing various measures. The negative 
impact of value at risk and optimal capital on a bad economy has to be avoided. 
Moreover, regulations need to be set in place when the optimal capital and the value at 
risk path do differ too much in a flourishing economy. Last, maybe the implemented 
measures should follow an anti-cyclical direction in order to be most effective.219 
 
                                                 
215
 Estrella (2004) p.1488 
216
 Estrella (2004) p.1488 
217
 Estrella (2004) p.1489 
218
 Estrella (2004) p.1493 
219
 Estrella (2004) p.1493 
 41 
Khorana and Perlman (2010) look at the 150 largest banks of the US and do find a 
procyclical relationship. However, it turns out that this behaviour is actually very 
dangerous and might decrease the value of a bank in the future. This becomes obvious 
when looking at the time before, during and after the financial crisis. In their sample 
they show that in the period of January 2003 and December 2007 banks pursued a 
procyclical strategy. This means that in a time of prosper banks reduced their equity by 
buying back shares and distributed dividends in the amount of $330 billion. However, 
during the financial crisis they have been forced to increase their capital. Additional 
$180 billions have been issued. Unfortunately, the issue prices have been lower than the 
previous share repurchase prices. It can be seen that existing shareholders have lost in 
comparison to the selling shareholders.220 
 
3.3 Capital Regulation over time 
The optimal capital structure of banks is defined in two ways: first, by the market 
constraints and second, by the regulatory constraints. This leads to a problem since the 
market values everything in market prices, whereas the regulatory constraints come in 
book values. Significant differences do evolve in accounting rules such as the US 
GAAP. Applying specific rules can lead to changes in book values (lease-back plan, 
loss and gain realisation).221 
 
3.3.1 The development up to now 
Capital minimum requirement standards are applied in order to protect the public from 
being forced to bear severe costs. Having too much risk on the balance sheet can make a 
bank vulnerable to shocks. Furthermore, in such an event a bank might need to use its 
deposit insurance or in the worst case scenario needs to be bailed out by the state. These 
two cases come at costs for the public and therefore, need to be successfully 
circumvented. The capital serves as additional buffer that is used before public funds 
need to be tapped.222 
However, regulations protect the above mentioned interests but are only in place since 
1981 in the United States. The introduction of regulations is formally established in the 
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International Lending Supervision Act. Nevertheless, these rules have been far from 
being perfect and critics have pointed out that the equal treatment of assets with 
different risks stimulates a wrong behaviour of banks. Meaning, that if the same capital 
requirement is applicable for different risks, than banks are better off to invest in high 
risk assets that at the same time promise higher returns.223 
Before Basel I has been set into place the US regulation of banks was defined the 
following: 
- “ “primary” capital” 224 >5,5% which included equity and loan loss reserves225 
- “ “secondary” capital” 226 >6% which mostly consisted of subordinated       
debentures227 
In order to level the playing field in the banking sector and to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage the Group of Ten committed to the Basel I regulations.228 
Basel I has tried to find a way to better reflect risk related to the required equity. 
Therefore, two forms of capital were defined: 
- Tier 1 capital: “includes common equity, noncumulative preferred stock, and 
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries.”229 
- Tier 2 capital: “includes the loan loss allowance (up to a maximum of 1.25% 
of RWA), cumulative and limited-life preferred stock, subordinated debentures 
and certain hybrid securities (such as mandatory convertible debt).”230 
The RWA are divided into four different categories and should make up for the 
weakness of the first regulations in the U.S. However, it has been criticised that, even 
though, there is now a distinction between assets risks, that there is still missing a 
mechanism to account for risk that is not defined as credit risk. Basel II has been created 
in 2004 to adjust for these weaknesses. The rating for credits can either be done by 
rating agencies or by the individual internal rating system of banks.231 
 
Basel I (and so does Basel II) requires banks to hold a certain amount of Tier 1 capital, 
which is 4% of RWA. Furthermore, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital together have to be over 
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8% of RWA.232 This is necessary to lessen the principal –agent problem that arises 
between depositors and banks.233 The FDICIA has tightened the constraints even more 
by requiring Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of 5% and 10%, respectively. 234 
 
3.3.2 The future outlook 
The financial crisis brought to attention that the composition of capital is crucial. 
Therefore, it matters of which components and of what quantity the Tier 1 capital is 
formed. Consequently, common capital has become popular, since it seems to be of 
high quality and for this reason Tier 1 capital should hold large quantities of that 
capital.235 The change of capital ratios is currently discussed and might be considered in 
the new Basel III regulations.236 The overall intention of the new regulation is to make it 
applicable to all banks, not just the biggest ones.237 
In an environment in which the asset quality of many assets deteriorates, the 
composition of capital is vital. In this case losses can no longer be balanced out by 
hybrid and common equity.238 This change in capital valuation shifts value from ”total 
Tier 1 to an emphasis on the distinction between loss absorbing or going concern 
capital239 versus non-loss absorbing or “gone concern” capital”240. This distinction 
should make sure that in the first case, which is expressed as Tier 1 capital, a bank is 
able to operate although it experiences some losses along the way. The second kind of 
capital, defined as Tier 2 capital, is supposed to ensure that in the event of bankruptcy 
the stakeholders (depositors and senior creditors) can be paid.241 
 
Additionally, regulation might intend to give an incentive for anticyclical behaviour 
because the procyclical management has turned out to hurt banks in the long run.242 
It has been discussed to also introduce a liquidity ratio but this idea has been put aside 
due to extensive criticism. Nevertheless, it is still on the mind of the committee and it is 
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just postponed. Furthermore, in these times liquidity is important and monitored even 
though it is not part of the actual Basel Accord.243 
In the end, the influence of higher capital ratios on the economy can only be estimates 
because there is no prior experience.244 
 
3.4  The Cost of Regulation 
Regulation is supposed to create benefits. However, Van den Heuvel (2008) argues 
that regulation comes at a cost. This negative impact is caused by the fact that a bank is 
hindered to create the maximum amount of liquidity. The best way to produce liquidity 
is through deposits. If the amount of deposits is limited or a certain amount of equity is 
required, than the possible liquidity that banks could offer differs from the optimal 
liquidity. The costs are related to how good a bank is when it comes to liquidity 
creation.245 Furthermore, if regulators would be able to perfectly supervise and detect 
excessive risk taking of each individual bank, than regulation could be applied to the 
respective bank’s capital adequacy ratios. Since this is not possible an overall regulation 
is imposed and that leads to these welfare costs.246  
The author manages to set up a model and more importantly an equation that can 
actually measure these costs. The formula looks the following way: 
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This expression takes into account the importance of liquidity to households and the 
returns on the different investments. It needs to be pointed out that the difference of the 
return on equity and deposits indicates how much liquidity is worth to households. They 
invest in deposits to create liquidity even though, the return on the respective 
investment is lower. The last term with the fraction variable represents the adjustment 
of the amount of deposits held in the event of an altering capital adequacy ratio under 
the condition that everything else stays the same. The economy is assumed to be in a 
steady state at the beginning. However, different first steady state economies with 
different capital structures can not just be compared.249 It has to be known that the 
following applies: “a manifestation of the envelope theorem: these quantities are 
constrained optimal in the sense of social planner’s problem, so their response to a 
change in γ has only a second-order effect on welfare”250. 
Additionally, the author provides a formula for the optimal capital adequacy. The 
following assumption needs to be valid. The social welfare can be increased by bank 
supervision but the supervision is not perfect. Therefore, capital needs to be employed. 
Furthermore, supervision and the amount of capital are positively correlated.251 
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It can be seen that there is always a trade off between costs and benefits (less 
supervision needed) of capital requirement.255 
 
Van den Heuvel (2008) puts his theory to a test, when he examines the data of US 
commercial banks between 1993 and 2004. In the event of the capital requirement being 
10% he calculates welfare costs of 0.22%. This means that at a level of 10% the loss in 
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consumption is 0.22%. Furthermore, lowering the level of capital requirement – under 
the assumption that everything else stays the same – creates yearly 1.bn$. Therefore, if 
supervision costs are the same or even lower than the lower capital requirement can 
create value. Furthermore, under the assumption that deposits are not free and 
everything else equal the social welfare costs are 0.10% of consumption.256  
Additionally, with the data available the author checks if the capital requirements in 
place are efficient. It is found that the “marginal effectiveness of supervision spending, 
αS,”
257
 is smaller than “1.6 (per billion $)”258. This is calculated for a capital 
requirement of γ=0.1. The result is a “marginal welfare benefit of 6.2bn $ per year”259. 
However, this is only valid if the bank supervision costs are plain spending costs. In the 
event where these costs take also compliance costs into account the number changes. 
Under the assumption that bank supervision costs consist of one third of plain spending 
costs and two thirds of compliance costs, αS becomes lower than 0.53 and the benefit 
simultaneously increases to 18.7 bn $. This is not the end of the story because in order 
to get the net gain, the welfare benefits and costs need to be analysed. Comparing the 
benefits to the lowest costs that can be calculated reveals that the deployed capital 
requirements are not efficient since the costs are higher than the benefits. Therefore, 
lowering the capital requirements can create value.260 
 
3.5 Does Regulation define the Capital Structure? 
In this part the question is, if capital regulation is indeed a binding factor or 
significantly influences the capital structure. 
 
For a long time Basel I seemed to be the most important constraint when setting the 
amount and structure of bank capital. Gropp and Heider (2010) argue that this might not 
always be true. Publicly traded banks can act as firms, which means that the Pecking 
Order Theory can be applied and Basel I must not be a first order constraint.261 
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Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) introduce a model that determines a bank’s optimal 
capital structure under the assumption that default is costly. In order to evaluate a 
bank’s default risk, factors that influence this risk needs to be identified. In the model 
regulation is active and the capital ratio is adjusted via deposit changes.262 Two other 
rather new aspects are: the introduction of a dynamic model which allows for 
continuous adjustment of deposits by banks and the introduction of a so-called “jump-
diffusion process”263. 264 
The following trade-off has to be considered when making financing decisions: the 
more assets held, the higher is the return but at the same time the regulation constraint is 
binding at an earlier stage of time. Furthermore, it is assumed that all deposits are 
insured and the moral hazard problem is not an issue, which means that the regulatory 
constraint is always fulfilled. Additionally, a change in bank financing (increasing the 
amount of deposits) is costly (advertising, marketing costs). These costs are borne by 
equity injections. Restructuring of a bank’s liabilities is necessary after a shock that has 
changed the value of the assets on the book. Moreover, the deposit adjustments do 
positively depend on the development of the value of the assets. In case of value 
accumulating in assets the deposits go up too and vice versa. Furthermore, the optimal 
capital depends also on the initial capital and restructuring barrier. If, the value of the 
assets drops below this barrier the bank defaults, because the value of the assets is 
insufficient to cover all the deposits this area is named “default region”265 by the 
authors.266 A bank’s deposit finance decision is negatively influenced the higher the 
volatility, the impact of change in asset value and the relative restructuring barrier. 
Furthermore, costs involved in the restructuring process and regulation are also 
negatively correlated with the amount of deposits held. It is intuitive that less favourable 
assets do increase the possibility of default. On the other hand, less valuable assets 
induce the bank to hold fewer deposits at an earlier point of time and so reduce the risk 
of default. Moreover, in this case banks tend to opt to change their deposits later in time. 
This behaviour is only shown in the dynamic model. Therefore, the effect of assets is 
twofold and can not be exactly determined without further investigation.267  
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The empirical outcome of Kozial and Lawrenz (2009) indicates the following. The 
most important risk for a bank’s default is the “jump risk”268. They further indicate that 
an effective regulation needs to be based on that kind of risk.269. 
Volatility and drift do not have an as substantial influence on default risk as primarily 
assumed. Moreover, in the dynamic model the cost of default turns out to be smaller at 
t=0. This is true under the following conditions, the drift is low and volatility is high, 
which leads to lower deposits in the first place. Furthermore, it can be observed that 
banks will restructure earlier.270  
These observations reveal a “self-regulation mechanism”271. Banks that are aware of 
the factors that influence the default risk will take countermeasures themselves, when 
they are confronted with weak investment alternatives. This means they do adjust their 
capital structure according to the risks involved even without regulatory pressure.272 
Last, restructuring costs have a significant influence on the risk of default which is 
again measure by today’s costs of default. Since these costs are not the same for all 
banks, it is difficult for the regulator to take account for them in the regulatory 
requirements.273  
 
Dietrich and James (1983) use in their study a peer group of over 10 000 commercial 
banks. The banks’ field of operations is limited to the US and the period is from 1971-
1975.274 They define “ABC”275 as factor which should capture changes of the capital due 
to regulatory rules or set ups. They “test the joint hypothesis that regulation is effective 
and that uninsured depositors do not influence capital structure”276. Out of the five 
sample years, only two are significant. There is no significant negative relationship 
between the variable “ABC”277 and bank capital in the sample period. Therefore, the 
hypothesis can be rejected. There is no empirical evidence that regulation has an impact 
of capital structure.278 
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Gropp and Heider (2010) do compare their outcome with a study about firms’ capital 
structure determinants. It is found that banks’ asset volatility and profitability is lower 
than the firms’, whereas a higher number of banks pay dividends. Furthermore, it is 
noticed that the banks’ leverage is much higher. The authors have found variables that 
do have an influence on the leverage.279 
For example higher profits do imply less leverage but higher asset risk and collateral.  
Gropp and Heider (2010) do another analysis by running a regression with the 
following form: 280 
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This regression says “The dependent variable is one minus the ratio of equity over 
assets in market values” 282 and the independent variables are market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, size, dividend paying and special country effects. The authors discover a 
positive relationship between leverage, size and collateral and a negative relationship 
between leverage market-to-book ratio, profits and dividends. All findings are 
statistically significant. Therefore, regulation does not seem to be the only factor 
influencing bank capital.283 
Furthermore, adjusting the above regression in a way to measure the dependence on 
the book leverage provides the same correlations. There should be some differences to 
the market leverage since regulation is always measured in book values. When factoring 
risk into the equation it shows a negative relationship with the market and book 
leverage. This does not support the argument that regulation has an influence on bank 
capital. Moreover, the result has the highest R2 in the book leverage analysis and is only 
outweighed by the market-to-book ratio in the market leverage analysis. On the other 
hand, taking risk out of the equation does not lead to the expected change in the 
significance of all other factors.284 
Additionally, taking into account banks’ specific fixed effects shows that they have an 
impact on banks’ capital. They explain 76% of the leverage in market values and even 
more (92%) of the leverage in book values. This is another indicator that regulation is 
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not defining bank capital.285 Furthermore, it shows that regulation is not so much 
responsible for bank capital since banks to not only hold the minimum bank capital in 
the end.286  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) find in their sample of the 100 largest US bank holding 
companies from 1896 until 2001 that banks significantly hold more bank capital than 
required. The mean Tier 1 capital was 7.26% in 1994 and peaked at 11.1% in 1994. 
Furthermore, Tier 1 and 2 capital was 9.44% in 1986 and at a high of 13.8% in 1994. 
This is another indicator that regulation does not ultimately define capital or constrains 
banks. Moreover, the authors show that the number of constrained banks has declined 
over the sample period. Such a bank is defined by a book capital ratio that is not higher 
that the regulatory demand plus 1.5%. Since the year 1992 the percentage of constrained 
banks is rather negligible.287 Flannery and Rangan (2008) also want to know if the 
capital ratio is higher due to regulations. They test the influence of portfolio risk on the 
capital ratio. This ratio is expressed in book values. The relationship is negative in three 
periods, which is one period longer than when conducted with “MKTRAT”288. 
However, the results show that regulation fails to provide an explanation for the 
development of the market equity ratio. 289 
 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) have observed different correlations for risk and capital 
buffers over time. Especially, after Basel I has been put into place, they find that banks 
have been interested in accumulating additional capital. This has been done to avoid any 
negative consequences (costs) in case of falling below the minimum capital required. 
Interestingly, in this period of time (the 1990ies) banks adjusted their ratios in both 
ways: increasing the capital buffer and, or reducing risk.290 
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4 Bank Capital in Practise 
4.1 The Development of Bank Capital Ratios over time 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) analyse the cyclical behaviour of capital buffers of European 
banks. Their work has been conducted under Basel 1988 and the related capital 
requirements.291 Jokipii and Milne (2008) find out that the capital buffers of European 
banks are significantly higher than required by the regulators. The amount of excess 
capital held differs from country to country. The buffers of smaller EU countries seem 
to be larger compared to the bigger countries. It is interesting that the buffers of the 
“EU15”292 are smaller than the ones held by “RAM10” 293 at 5.14%.294 “RAM10” 295 is 
defined as “10 countries that joined the EU in May 2000”296. The sample consists of 
468 banks of the “EU25” 297 in the period of 1997 until 2004. Furthermore, the authors 
have divided the peer group into three subgroups: commercial, savings and co-operative 
banks. Additionally, banks are categorised by size into large and small banks, where a 
large bank is considered to have a median of at least €37 billion of balance sheet sum in 
2004. Furthermore, the sample is divided into “RAM10” 298 and “EU15” 299. The 
“EU15”300 is again divided into the Euro area and the non-Euro area, consisting of 
Denmark, Sweden and UK.301  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) look at “common equity’s market value to the market 
value of total assets (defined as the sum of equity’s market value plus liabilities’ book 
value)” 302. Starting in 1990 the ratio has begun to rise and has hit its highest value in 
1998 at 20.1%. Furthermore, the authors discovered that the asset volatility has 
dramatically risen to 6.09% between 1998 and 2001, compared to 1.76% in the period 
of 1986-1999. This higher risk could be due to the Asia crisis in 1997 and some 
deregulations in the banking sector. The findings indicate that banks have taken on 
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larger amounts of capital since their assets have become more risky. It is not clear why 
they did so. Flannery and Rangan (2008) suggest that it might be because of outside 
pressure. Furthermore, it could also be an artefact in the sample. This means dividends 
do not increase as quickly and proportional as earnings, while earnings are high, the 
amount of dividends stays almost the same and the rest is kept in the banks as retained 
earnings, which automatically leads to higher equity. Moreover, a higher, maybe 
overvalued share price could have given incentives to the managers to even issue 
additional shares. Therefore, the capital would have risen without managers actively 
trying to build up capital to insure against default and riskier assets. On the other side, 
after the peak of equity capital in 1997 management seems to have taken measures to, 
again, increase the leverage. This was done by cutting down equity and issuing 
debentures. 303 
The increase of capital is explained by market and by passive phenomena. Flannery 
and Rangan (2008) precisely define five effects: shareholder demanding higher capital 
for riskier assets, changes in the riskiness of the underlying assets, the combination of 
the effects already mentioned, passive effects such as stock price changes and last other 
technical effects. The difference in the capital ratio between 1986-1989 and 1998-2001 
is with 42% explained by the market power (shareholders’ demands). However, the 
riskier portfolio has a negative influence (67%). The sum of these two effects and the 
single effects explain 87.9% of the difference. In contrast, the passive effects contribute 
only 3% and the technical component are responsible for 13%.304 
 
Chen (2010) takes up the concept of market-values as suggested in the paper of 
Flannery and Rangan (2008). He analyses, how stock returns and profits influence the 
capital ratios of Japanese’s banks over time. The sample consists of listed commercial 
banks from 1977 to 2009. The data is based on yearly and market value data.305 First 
value-weighted capital ratios are calculated. They are derived as the banks’ individual 
total market capitalisation and weighted. It can be seen that also in Japan the value has 
been around 4.34 from 1977-1983. After that period an increase has been noticeable 
with the highest level of 17.9 in 1987. The following years have been characterised by a 
decline to 3.59 which marks the Japanese banking crisis in 2003. A recovery has been 
dampened by the crisis in 2007 and 3.62 marks the end of the sample period. In order to 
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better analyse the variation of capital ratios, the influence of profits and changes in the 
stock values are separated. The author finds that the difference in capital ratios over 
time is caused by the expected stock return. On the contrary, the cross-sectional analysis 
seems to be the result of a mixture of expected profitability and stock returns.306 
  
4.2 The Capital Buffer Theory 
The theory of capital buffers has developed from the charter value theory. That theory 
takes into account that distressed banks do have much more to lose than just deposits 
and equity; they will also lose future profits. This motivates them to hold on to more 
capital than required by the regulation authorities.307 However, holding excess capital 
does come at costs, so there is a trade-off between holding additional capital and the 
costs of falling below the required amount. Last, the capital buffer theory should not be 
applicable to banks that have huge capital buffers, because their chances of falling 
below the minimum requirement and therefore, experiencing costs due to regulation are 
very low.308 
Generally speaking, the bank capital buffer depends on the variables presented below.  
 
4.2.1 Data 
In order to better understand the influence of the different variables on the capital 
buffer the samples are described in this section. Several authors have conducted 
different analyses across different countries and time periods. 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) have created a sample which has already been presented 
in the previous section.309 
 
Fonseca and González (2010) take their data from the Databank Bankscope. They 
work with consolidated numbers. The sample period is from 1995-2002. After some 
adjustments the authors end up analysing banks from 70 different countries. A 
generalized method of moments estimator is used, and panel data to take account for 
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endogeneity. The dependent variable capital buffer is given in relative values. Results 
do not change when using absolute values.310 
 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) conduct their analysis based on US commercial banks and 
bank holding companies. The sample period is from 1986 to 2008. The information 
used can be found in the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income.311 
 
The sample of Jokipii and Milne (2008) has already been described in the section 
above.312 
 
Lindquist (2004) is analysing the influence of certain factors on the capital buffer of 
Norwegian savings and commercial banks. The period under observation is from 1995-
2001 and quarterly data is used for the analyses. The author finds out that savings and 
commercial banks’ capital buffer do indeed react differently to some of the tested 
variables.313 
 
Stolz and Wedow (2011) analyse the effects of the business cycle on banks’ capital 
buffer, which is composed the following way: “banks’ capital buffers (BUF) as the 
Basel capital to risk-weighted assets ratio minus 8 percent regulatory minimum”314.315 
As dataset 492 West German corporative and savings banks are used, only banks with 
positive capital buffers are taken into account. The observed period is from 1993-
2001.316  
 
The sample and the methods of Schaeck and Cihák (2010) are already explained 
earlier in the thesis.  
 
                                                 
310
 Fonseca and González (2010) p.895 
311
 Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.167 
312
 Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1441 
313
 Lindquist (2004) p.499 
314
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.100 
315
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.98-99 
316
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) p 102 
 55 
4.2.2 Costs 
4.2.2.1 Funding Costs 
Funding costs do influence the amount of buffer that a bank holds. In general, 
shareholders do require a higher return on their capital since the risk involved is higher 
too. In case of deposit insurance lending to banks is riskless for depositors. Therefore, 
the interest rate asked is the risk free rate. In this event banks will not hold a capital 
buffer. Deposits are the cheapest way of financing because risk and capital are not 
related. On the other hand, when there is no or only partly deposit insurance than the 
rate demanded by depositors depends on the risk involved. Furthermore, an increased 
leverage drives up the equity interest rates too.317 In the end, the augmented costs of 
deposit financing have a positive and highly significant impact on the capital buffer.318 
 
Table 19: The influence of funding costs on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González (2010) + yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.899 
  
4.2.2.2 Financial Distress Costs 
Financial distress costs have an impact on the buffer capital. These costs comprise 
legal, bankruptcy and distress costs, additionally, to the loss of the charter value. This 
value is even higher when the bank possesses some kind of market power.319  
 
Fonseca and González (2010) use the LERNER index to account for market power.320 
They find that capital buffer and the LERNER are positively and significantly related; 
however, when using the LERNERQ the relationship changes to a negative one. They 
interpret the results the following: banks that have higher market power do not rely that 
much on capital buffers, they have other means to compensate losses.321 
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Jokipii and Milne (2011) do support the argument that banks with higher charter 
values have more to lose and therefore, accumulate a higher buffer. Significance is 
found in six out of seven models. The findings are the same if testing the risk adjusting 
equation. The later equation is highly significantly related in all cases.322 Furthermore, 
the simultaneous equation shows a positive and significant correlation in all three 
specifications in the capital regression. Nevertheless, the risk equation changes to a 
significant negative relationship for in all cases.323 
 
Table 20: The influence of financial distress costs on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González (2010) + than −  yes, at 1% both times 
Jokipii and Milne (2011)  +/ − yes, at 1%, 10% / 1% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and González (2010) p.899; Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.171-174 
  
4.2.2.3 Adjustment Costs 
Adjustment costs need be considered when talking about capital buffers too.324 Banks 
might tend to hold more capital than required, in order to avoid costs that would occur, 
if elevating the level of capital on short notice.325 Furthermore, banks might want to 
avoid falling below the required standard, because that can result in fines. This is often 
true for profitable banks that pay dividends.326 It can signal the wrong information about 
banks when shocks are only equalled out through equity. Additionally, adjusting the 
capital ratio through asset adjustments takes away the possibility to stay liquid in case 
of upcoming profitable project.327 
 
Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) prove that adjustment costs and capital buffers are 
positively related at a highly significant level. Furthermore, they confirm that 
adjustment costs hinder banks to achieve a total adjustment to the desired capital 
ratio.328 
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Jokipii and Milne (2008) find in their country group sample a positive and highly 
significant relationship between adjustment costs and capital buffers. However, not 
every group tested shows significant results. Furthermore, the non-Euro country group 
experiences a negative and highly significant correlation.329 Conducting analyses within 
the “EU15”330 group reveals that adjustment costs play the most significant role for 
commercial banks. For savings banks these costs are significant too, whereas co-
operative banks do not seem to depend on them due to the insignificance.331 There is no 
difference between the small and large banks when testing for the correlation with 
adjustment costs. The relationship is positive and significant. It can be said that these 
costs might be of higher importance for larger banks due to the higher significance.332 
 
In Lindquist (2004) the effect of the costs of additional capital is twofold. Savings 
banks seem to be negatively correlated, which supports the argument that this buffer is 
used as insurance payment, whereas commercial banks are positively correlated.333 
 
Table 21: The influence of adjustment costs on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González (2010) + Yes, at 1% 
Jokipii and Milne (2008)  + than − yes, at 1% for both 
Lindquist (2004)  − / +  yes, at 1% / 5% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.898-899; Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1447-1449; 
Lindquist (2004) p.505-509 
  
4.2.3 Retained Earnings 
Retained earnings can have a positive effect, if they are used to build up capital. On 
the contrary, if big banks are motivated to hold less capital buffers due to their high 
earnings, than earnings do have a negative impact.334 
 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) find in their country group analyses of European banks on a 
country level that the impact of return on equity on the capital buffer is significantly 
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negative, even though, the effect does not seem to be quite large.335 Testing the 
influence of ROE on buffers of different kinds of banks shows similar results. In the 
“EU15” 336 sample the coefficient of savings bank is more significant than ones of the 
other banks.337 
 
Table 22: The influence of retained earnings on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Jokipii and Milne (2008)  − yes, at 1% - 10% 
Adapted from: Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1447-1449 
 
4.2.4 Size 
The effect of a bank’s size on the amount of capital buffer is less clear. Larger banks 
might either have easier access to cheaper capital because the market has better 
information about them or it might be more difficult for them due to their high 
complexity and their incentive to exploit asymmetric information.338 In order to reduce 
the asymmetric information a bank can either engage in monitoring or hold a significant 
amount of capital. In case of any economies of scale in the monitoring area, a larger 
bank should do more monitoring and a smaller bank should take on more capital instead 
of engaging a lot in monitoring. Furthermore, larger banks might have a diversification 
advantage. Therefore, they might be less vulnerable to exogenous shocks, which could 
have a negative impact on the amount of extra capital held. In addition, banks do profit 
from the too-big-to-fail argument which also has a negative influence on the buffer.339  
 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) identify that size and capital are negatively related in the 
single capital buffer equation. However, the result does not show significance in all 
models (five out of seven are insignificant). In the simultaneous equations the capital 
equation and size are positively and significantly related. Nevertheless, the risk equation 
shows a positive relationship, but all these results lack significance.340 
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Jokipii and Milne (2008) use dummy variables to measure the effect of size. They 
introduce two variables “BIG”341 and “SMALL”342. The first is one if the bank is in the 
highest decile of asset size and zero in any other case. The second variable is one if the 
bank is in the lowest 30 percentile again measured by the size of assets, in any other 
event it is zero.343 The “BIG”344 variable reveals a negative relationship but is 
insignificant in the following subsamples: “EU15”345, non-EU countries and “RAM” 346. 
This is consistent with the theory that the smaller the bank, the larger the buffer and the 
larger the bank the smaller the buffer. The “SMALL”347 variable is tested positively. 
This result is only slightly significant in “EU15”348, “EA” 349 (=Euro area) and the 
“RAM” 350 sample.351 Testing the impact of the “EU15”352 different kinds of banks does 
not change the quality of the result. However the only significant result is shown when 
analysing small savings banks.353 
 
Lindquist (2004) finds that the buffer of commercial and savings banks do react 
negatively with the size variables. However, size is less significant for commercial 
banks.354 
 
The negative relationship is further supported by Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010)355, 
Stolz and Wedow (2011)356 as well as Schaeck and Cihák (2010) in their sample of 
testing just commercial banks.357 The authors of the last study however, test if this size 
effect is related to the above mentioned diversification advantage. It turns out that in 
their analyses diversification has no influence on the negative relationship of size and 
capital buffer. Furthermore, the too-big-to-fail argument is put to test. The authors 
adjust the sizes necessary to be too-big-to-fail in the respective country. Medium and 
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large size banks show a negative and significant relationship with capital in their 
regressions. Apart from the too-big-to-fail argument the authors conclude that smaller 
banks might be required to hold larger capital since their resources of managing risk are 
much less advanced. There is no empirical prove for this conclusion.358 Testing with all 
three kinds of banks also shows that smaller banks seem to be better capitalised, which 
they again explain with the monitoring argument.359 
 
Table 23: The influence of size on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Jokipii and Milne (2011)  − yes, at 10%  
Jokipii and Milne (2008) − / + yes, at 5% - 10% for both 
Lindquist (2004)  − yes, at  1% / 5% 
Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) − yes, at 1% 
Stolz and Wedow (2011)  − yes, at 1% 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010)  − yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.173-174; Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1449; Lindquist (2004) 
p.505-509; Fonseca and González (2010) p.899; Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.103; 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010) p.13-16 
 
4.2.5 Loan Loss 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) discover that, this variable is positively correlated with the 
amount of additional capital held. These findings are also valid when measuring the 
change in risk. Therefore, banks that have more loans at possible default on their book 
are also considered riskier. The results of the single capital equation are significant in 
five models and insignificant in two models. The significance ranges from 1%, 5% to 
the 10% level. Moreover, the risk equation shows the same relationship with significant 
results in three out of four models.360 When running the simultaneous equation the 
relationship turns significant in all three models in the capital equation. Nevertheless, 
the risk equation only shows significance in two models.361 
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Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) have empirically discovered that riskier banks do not 
hold higher capital buffers. The relationship is significantly negative. Nevertheless, that 
outcome might not be that clear since there is an indication of “correlation between the 
instruments and the error term” 362.363 
 
In Lindquist (2004) savings banks’ buffers are not significantly related with loan 
losses. However, commercial banks reveal are negatively and significantly correlated.364 
 
Table 24: The influence of loan loss on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Jokipii and Milne (2011)  + yes, at 1% - 10% 
Fonseca and González (2010)  − yes, at 1% 
Lindquist (2004) − yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.171-174; Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.899Lindquist 
(2004) p.503-507 
 
4.2.6 Liquidity  
Liquid assets do also influence the capital buffer. Since banks with more liquid assets 
have better opportunities to adjust their capital ratios, the influence is negative in theory. 
Furthermore, these assets are almost classified as risk free so their impact is quite 
obvious when it comes to calculating the amount of capital that needs to be set aside 
due to the risk weighted asset regulations.365 
 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) find that the higher the liquidity the less capital buffer is held 
by banks in the single capital equation. However, the results are not significant in every 
model. Only two reveal significance whereas five models do not. The risk equation even 
shows a positive relationship. Nevertheless, the results are only significant in 50% of 
the cases.366 Furthermore, the simultaneous equation does still show the negative 
relation with the capital equation but loses all the significance. The risk equation does 
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not change the direction of the relationship either, but is only significant in one out of 
three specifications.367 
 
However, Stolz and Wedow (2011) reveal a significantly positive relationship.368 
 
Studies have shown that increased liquidity can act as a substitute for excessive 
capital. Interestingly Wagner (2007) has conducted analyses indicating that increased 
liquidity is actually harmful to the economy.369 The author finds out that growing 
liquidity gives banks the option to sell off their risky assets in the secondary market. 
While this has a positive impact on the banking stability it soon turns into a negative 
relationship. Wagner (2007) explains this with the following argument: banks profit 
from increased liquidity because it has the advantage that the value of banks goes up, 
whereas the costs of liquidation decrease. Banks being aware of that fact take on more 
risk on their balance sheet. This reaches a point where the positive effect of increased 
asset liquidity is not only set off but outweighed.370 Wagner (2007) finds out that capital 
regulation is a way of tackling this problem; however, it becomes less effective the 
more liquid the assets are. Therefore, he suggests penalties as a way of mitigating the 
problem. Such a penalty could be, for example, to make bank failures more costly for 
their owners.371 
 
Table 25: The influence of liquidity on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Jokipii and Milne (2011)  − No 
Stolz and Wedow (2011) + yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.171-174; Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.103; 
  
4.2.7 Asset Risk 
Asset risk can have a twofold influence on the amount of capital that is held. A 
positive one is found if banks outweigh their riskier assets with higher profits and 
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therefore, holding more capital than required by Basel I and II. On the other hand, the 
impact is negative, if banks have to cut down the amount of risky asset held.372 
 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) define risk in their country group study as “non-performing 
loans over total lending”373. The findings are twofold significant: the relationship is 
positive for the major samples, only the non-Euro group experiences a negative impact 
of risk on the capital buffer.374 In the “EU15” 375 and subgroups the relationship is again 
twofold. The commercial and cooperative banks’ buffers are still moving in the same 
direction with risk, whereas savings banks reveal a negative relationship.376 When 
testing for differences due to the size of banks, large and small banks are positively 
correlated. The relationship is significant.377 
 
Lindquist (2004) finds that capital buffers of savings and commercial banks are 
negatively correlated with risk, which means that banks do not adjust their capital in 
case of higher risks. Nevertheless, the author argues that this outcome must not be a 
sign for insufficient capital buffers. It can just mean that in reality banks with a lower 
credit risk are overcapitalised. 378 
 
As it can be seen the influence of risk on the amount of capital buffer is rather 
controversial. Jokipii and Milne (2011) are the first who break the influence of risk up 
into long and short term effects. They expect the relationship of banks capital buffers 
and portfolio risk to be negative. This is based on the assumption that risk loving banks 
will have a lower capital buffer.379 However, according to the capital buffer theory they 
expect a “positive time series correlation between adjustments in capital and risk”380. 
They find that in the years before 1993, risk and buffer had a negative relationship 
which changes afterwards. They perform their tests in three ways: analysing the changes 
of capital buffers, then observing the changes in risk and finally, testing the two 
equations simultaneously. Testing the relationship of capital buffer and risk with single 
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equations leads to the following results: capital and risk are positively related. This is in 
line with the assumption that higher risk makes banks take on higher amounts of 
capital.381 This previously found relationship is also valid, when tested simultaneously. 
The findings can be used to argue that managers try to hold an amount of buffer so that 
they will not fall below the minimum capital requirements in order to avoid the related 
costs. Furthermore, these two variables are instruments to regulate the “probability of 
default”382. Another argument that might explain the findings is the manager’s aversion 
towards risk. In cases if, he is compensated with risk and bank related remuneration he 
has personal value at stake and therefore, he will be interested in decreasing the risk 
sometimes even to a lower level than required by the stockholders. However, Jokipii 
and Milne (2011) find a negative relationship between the amount of capital held and 
the adjustment of short-term risk and capital buffer. This indicates that less capitalised 
banks cut their risk when simultaneously building up capital. On the other hand, this 
could be seen the following way: banks seek risk in the attempt to regain strong capital 
buffers in the event of being close to reaching the minimum of regulatory required 
capital. The actions of well capitalised banks are vice versa, meaning that they seek risk 
when capital declines. They regulate their capital ratio via positive adjustments, such as 
taking on risk in situations when the capital has gone up.383 
 
Table 26: The influence of  asset risk on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Jokipii and Milne (2008)  
+ (for major 
sample) 
yes, at 1% 
Lindquist (2004)  − yes, only at 50% / 1%, 50% 
Jokipii and Milne (2011) + yes, at 10% 
Adapted from: Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1449; Lindquist (2004) p.499, 505-509; Jokipii and Milne 
(2011) p.171-174 
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4.2.8 Mergers  
Mergers do play a role in the event of building capital buffers. Generally, it can be 
said that banks that are well capitalised do get acquired, but after a merger the capital 
ratio is far lower. Therefore, the impact is expected to be negative.384  
 
However, Stolz and Wedow (2011) reveal a positive and significant relationship. They 
explain that phenomenon the following way: mergers often happen with a larger bank 
and large seize banks tend to be less capitalised. This could lead to a positive sign. 
Furthermore, distressed banks that are merged have better capital ratios after the 
event.385 
 
Table 27: The influence of mergers on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Stolz and Wedow (2011) + yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.103 
 
4.2.9 Quality of Accounting Information 
In order for the market to create an environment in which the investors demand banks 
to be supervised, the information provided must be valid and relevant. Fonseca and 
Gonzãlez (2010) expect a positive relationship between accounting information and 
capital buffers. Better information is expected to literally drive down the costs of 
bankruptcy but also the related losses of the charter values.386 This assumption is proven 
valid. Better information does empower the market and therefore, banks tend to hold 
capital higher than the required minimum. This result is further supported by the 
LERNER index which shows a negative relationship in countries with insignificant 
accounting rules.387 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
384
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.101 
385
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.103 
386
 Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.894 
387
 Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.899 
 66 
Table 28: The influence of quality of accounting information on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González 
(2010) 
+ yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.899 
 
4.2.10 The Extent of Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance exists in two forms: first, deposits that are actively insured and 
second, indirectly all deposits are insured on some level since banks are too big and too 
important for the economy to be let down.388 
As already mentioned above deposit insurance is valid if it comes to defining the 
amount of capital buffer, which indicates a negative relationship.389 On the contrary, 
there is research that reveals that charter value and deposit insurance do have a positive 
correlation. This indicates that banks would very well take on additional capital in order 
to preserve their higher initial value.390  
 
Fonseca and González (2010) find that deposit insurance and capital buffer are indeed 
negatively correlated.391 
 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010) test the effect of deposit insurance on the amount of capital 
buffers held by commercial banks, but their results are not significant.392 However, 
including savings and cooperative banks into the sample reveals a significant positive 
relationship between capital and deposit insurance.393 
 
Table 29: The influence of the extent of deposit insurance on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González 
(2010) 
− yes, at 1% 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010)  + yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.899; Schaeck and Cihák (2010) p.15-16 
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4.2.11 Regulation of Banks’ Businesses  
The more additional business a bank is allowed to perform along with the lending 
transactions, the more supervision is needed. Therefore, banks that are forced to stick to 
their core activities do not require further monitoring by the market, which would lead 
to smaller capital buffers.394  
 
The analyses of Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) with this variable reveal results that are 
twofold. There is a negative and a positive relationship between capital and activity 
restriction. The first argues that in a restricted environment capital buffers become less 
important. On the other hand, the later indicates that market power gains strengths and 
therefore, demands higher capital. After accumulating these two opposite effects, the 
positive effect outweighs the negative.395 
 
Table 30: The influence of the extent of regulation of banks' businesses on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González 
(2010) 
+ not given 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.901  
 
4.2.12 Official Supervision 
The variable can help if banks are potentially facing bankruptcy, or if a manager needs 
to be substituted, who fails to perform. In those cases it can lead to an overall risk 
reduction. Therefore, official supervision is positively correlated with capital buffers. 
On the other side, in cases if official supervision substitutes market supervision the 
relationship is negative. Furthermore, the charter value can increase due to the fact that 
investors do not have to fear any type of rent extraction. On the contrary, the charter 
value might go down since the allocation of investment and risk is not the same as it 
would be under deposit insurance. All in all, the effects of supervision are not quite 
clear.396  
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The analysis of Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) shows a negative effect, however, the 
Lerner index reveals a positive relationship. Summing up these two effects, the result is 
positive.397 
 
Lindquist (2004) calls the variable “supervisory scrutiny and is measured by the 
number of on-site inspections by the supervisory authority in Norway”398. The result 
shows that regulation does not have an impact at all, only commercial banks seem to 
positively react to that variable.399 
 
Table 31: The influence of official supervision on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and Gonzãlez 
(2010)  
+ not given 
Lindquist (2004) + yes, at 1%, 50% / 1%-5% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.901; Lindquist (2004) p.505-509 
 
4.2.13 Institutions 
Legal enforcement is the key term in this field. The market (formed by investors) is 
only willing to carry out monitoring tasks, if contracts and laws can be enforced. On the 
other hand, a higher number of competitors decreases all the positive effects that come 
with acting like a monopoly, therefore, banks can benefit from holding a higher amount 
of capital buffer.400  
 
The empirical results show a negative relationship, as assumed above. However, a 
positive effect even though of none significance can be observed too.401 
 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010) conduct analyses on the effect of shareholder rights on the 
capital buffer of commercial banks. Their results show a positive relationship, which 
means that in countries where shareholder rights are valued banks do hold higher 
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amounts of capital.402 The outcome is the same if enlarging the sample group by 
cooperative and savings banks.403 
 
Table 32: The influence of institutions on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González 
(2010) 
− yes, at 1% 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010)  +  yes, at 1% 
Adapted from: Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.901; Schaeck and Cihák (2010) p.19 
 
4.2.14 Economic Cycle 
Banks tend to build up their loan portfolio in times the economy is performing well. It 
is than extremely important that banks do adjust their capital ratios in order to be 
prepared for less prospective times.  
 
Stolz and Wedow (2011) find that banks raise their capital buffers during a weak 
economy but the business cycle has no influence in good times. However, it is 
discovered that low capitalised banks show a different behaviour. Surprisingly, they 
seem to cut their capital buffers at anytime, meaning they have smaller buffers in good 
and bad times. Moreover, there is a slight difference between savings and corporate 
banks. It is shown that in good times savings banks with high capital buffers do 
significantly increase their cushions, whereas, cooperative banks that are already low 
capitalised decline the buffers even more during bad times.404 
 
The effects of the economic cycle on the amount of capital buffers held depend on the 
individual country. The relationship turns out to be negative in the following countries: 
Chile, Denmark, France, Indonesia, the Philippines, the UK and the US. However, 
Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Italy and Romania are positively correlated. The effects of all 
the other tested countries are missing statistic significance.405 
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Schaeck and Cihák (2010) find that “GDP growth, inflation, and real interest rates, 
show some negative association with capital ratios”406. The results are significant in the 
H-statistics.407 
 
Lindquist (2004) discovers that the buffer is moving anti-cyclical with the economy, 
which is interpreted as banks stocking up to be able to invest in good projects at any 
time.408 
 
In Jokipii and Milne (2008) the following samples are significantly negatively 
correlated with the domestic GDP growth (used as cycle variable): the “EU25” 409, the 
“EU15” 410 and the Euro and non-Euro group. The non-Euro group has experienced the 
highest negative influence on the capital buffer. However, the “RAM10” 411 group 
points in the other direction. This means that its correlation with the domestic GDP 
growth is positive. Employing “EU15” 412 or “EU25” 413 GDP growth as a measure for 
the cycle does not change the quality of the results.414 Testing the influence on capital 
buffers in relation to different kinds of banks has only been done with the “EU15” 415 
sample. The correlation of capital buffers of commercial and savings banks and 
economic cycle is still negative. However, co-operative banks show a behaviour that 
points in the other direction, namely a positive correlation. The significance is larger for 
commercial banks which can lead to the conclusion that in the country group results 
above commercial banks are mainly responsible for the negative impact.416 Comparing 
large banks to small banks does lead to twofold results. On the one hand, economic 
indicators do have a positive as well as a significant correlation with excess capital of 
small banks. However, the direction is vice versa for large banks.417 
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Table 33: The influence of the economic cycle on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Stolz and Wedow (2011)  − / + No 
Fonseca and González (2010) − / + yes, 1% - 5% 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010)  −  yes, at 1% 
Lindquist (2004)  − yes, at 5% - 10% / 5% - 10% 
Jokipii and Milne (2008)  −  yes, at 1% - 5% 
Adapted from: Stolz and Wedow (2011) p. 102-105; Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010) p.901; Schaeck and 
Cihák (2010) p.16; Lindquist (2004) p.505-509; Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1446-1449;  
 
4.2.15 Competition 
Fonseca and González (2010) use LERNER in order to define market power, but they 
take it up it to explain financial distress costs as explained above.418 I think that the 
argument about market power would as well fit in here since market power and 
competition are related. 
 
Lindquist (2004) reveals that competition initiates banks to hold more capital. In this 
case the market does seem to have a positive influence on capital buffers at least this 
seems to be true for savings banks.419  
 
Table 34: The influence of competition on the capital buffer 
 Relationship Significance 
Fonseca and González (2010)  + than − yes, at 1% both times 
Lindquist (2004)  + yes, at 1%  
Adapted from: Fonseca and González (2010) p.897; Lindquist (2004) p.505-509 
 
4.3  The Adjustment of Capital Ratios 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) introduce a new model in order to find out how banks 
do adjust their capital ratios. They do this by analysing each bank separately and using 
monthly data of “regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets”420 of German banks.421 In 
the end it leaves them with 81 banks to be analysed with a minimum of 50 observations 
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per bank. These banks can be further split up into 25 private commercial banks, 32 
savings banks, 15 banks of a cooperative division and nine with no matching relation.422 
A Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein model is used. The only modification made, is the 
introduction of an adjustment possibility of the debt ratio via increasing the amount of 
risky assets, which is additionally offered to the traditional method of changes in the 
capital.423 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) test three different variables in order to derive their 
results. Tier 1 ratio is defined as in the Basel Accord, the total capital ratio is “total 
capital over RWA of the banking book”424 and the own-fund variable is total capital 
plus “subordinated debt with a relatively short residual term and unrealized profits in 
the trading book”425 over RWA.426 
 
In general, it can be said that the alternative hypothesis can be assumed, which means 
that banks do adjust their capital ratios. More precisely, in the previous sample testing 
for the Tier 1 ratio 17 out of 81 banks could assume the alternative hypothesis, testing 
for the total capital ratio 27 out of 81 banks rejected the null hypothesis and 28 out of 81 
when tested for the own capital ratio.427 
The paper by Memmel and Raupach (2010) is based on three additional hypotheses: 
“Hypothesis 1. The more a bank is engaged in proprietary trading (in particular, the 
larger the contribution of the trading book to total-bank risk-weighted assets), the more 
likely the bank adjusts its capital ratio.”428 
“Hypothesis 2. Private commercial banks are more likely to adjust their capital ratio 
than public sector banks.”429 
“Hypothesis 3. There are compensatory effects between the three strategic 
parameters: the bank’s target capital ratio, its adjustment speed and its asset volatility. 
The “probability or insufficient regulatory capital (PIRC)” 430 is the key to the banks’ 
choice of these parameters.”431 
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The first hypothesis turns out to hold. Proprietary trading is represented by market 
which is derived the following way: “RWA of the trading book, divided by total-bank 
RWA”432. This can be due to the facts that these banks have a better control over their 
assets, maybe they hold more liquid assets and they can more easily take on measures to 
manage the risk of the assets that they are holding.433 
The second hypothesis is valid too. The results are derived from the own funds ratio. 
The sample is split into different types of banks. Afterwards, it is analysed whether and 
how many banks are significantly (10% level) adjusting their capital ratios. Again, the 
overall number is 28 banks for the own funds ratio. After the division in different types 
of banks, it can be seen that the private ones have indeed the highest adjustment rate.434  
The third hypothesis is more complex. Falling below the imposed regularly threshold 
is driven by three ways: the amount of capital held (target debt ratio), the volatility of 
the assets on the book and the speed of adjusting the capital ratio.435 The analyses are 
again conducted with all three variables and within those variables with the number of 
banks that adjust their ratios at the 10% level of significance. This means that the Tier 1 
sample contains 17 banks, the total capital sample has 26 banks (one had to be 
eliminated) and the own funds sample consists of 27 banks (again one needed to be 
dropped). The outcome for compensatory effects is less clear. While the own funds ratio 
seems to be experiencing the predicted relationships, the other capital variables do not 
show the same behaviour. The own funds variable is significantly positively related 
with the adjustment rate (the higher the target debt ratio, the higher the adjustment 
rate).436 Therefore, “the negative log debt ratio (own funds)” 437 is interpreted as 
follows: a high target debt ratio represents low capital. Furthermore, the asset volatility 
and the own funds ratio are significantly negatively related. However, the Tier 1 ratio 
and total capital ratio reveal a negative relationship with the adjustment rate. The first 
correlation is significant the second is insignificant but both are different than predicted. 
Both, Tier 1 ratio and total capital ratio, are significantly negatively related with asset 
volatility. The authors argue that hypothesis 3 still fits because the amount of actual Tier 
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1 capital way outperforms the required amount. Therefore, this regulatory requirement 
constrains a bank less.438 
In a last step Memmel and Raupach (2010) try to find out if just one “PIRC”439 “can 
explain the compensatory effects in the strategic variables”440, by using the own funds 
ratio. The first non-linear regression tests for the required regulation being 8% of the 
own funds and is based on least squared errors. The findings are that banks do fall 
below the regulatory minimum in 0.71% cases. The second non-linear regression is 
based on a best fit model. That means that the lowest possible squared errors are found 
by adjusting the minimum requirements and the “PIRC” 441. The results indicate that in 
that case the optimal requirement of own funds is above 8% and the “PIRC” 442 rises to 
1.78%. In both models the R² is over 70% which means that the “model explains two-
thirds of the cross-sectional variation in the panel of log debt ratios”443. This means that 
the “PIRC”444 can be a reason for different levels of leverage of banks.445 
 
4.3.1 The Adjustment Speed 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) find that banks adjust their capital ratios; however, the 
speed of adjustment is not the same within the three different capital variables. Testing 
the speed of adjustment for all the banks that have proven to adjust their capital ratios at 
the 10% percent significance level leads to the following results. Tier 1 has a median 
adjustment rate of 19.48% per months, total capital has a median rate of 24.30% per 
month and own funds adjusts with a median rate of 18.23% per month. This means, for 
example, for the last result that the difference between target capital ratio and the actual 
ratio is reduced by 18% each month.446 
 
On the contrary Gropp and Heider (2010) have found adjustment ratios much lower 
than the above discovered ones. All their analyses are conducted with book values since 
regulatory constraints and implications are measured this way. The speed of adjustment 
is measured with OLS analysis and is 9% per period which is similar to the adjustment 
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speed of companies. If the calculations take specific bank fixed effects into account than 
the speed dramatically rises to 45%. This indicates that the bank specific effects do play 
an important role when it comes to setting bank capital and adjustments. 447  
 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) analyse the adjustment rate to the optimal capital 
structure. Since adjustment is not always costless it can be beneficial to only partly 
converge to the optimal ratio. The underlying model allows for this partly change. They 
find that the adjustment speed is not the same within the four time blocks (mentioned 
earlier in the paper) it varies from 29% to 74% per year. Calculating the average leads 
to 49% per year. This means that banks do converge to their target capital ratios quicker 
than non-financial companies. Constraining the regression by not allowing the share 
price change effect lowers the adjustment speed to 30% per year with greater 
differences within the observed periods.448 
 
The outcome from above is similar to what Jokipii and Milne (2011) have discovered. 
The adjustment is tested in three ways: first by adjusting the capital, second by adjusting 
the risk and last by running an equation that allows capital and risk to adjust 
simultaneously. The single capital equation experiences significant adjustment rates 
from 4% to 9% per quarter, depending on what variables have been used for risk in the 
different models. The adjustment speed is the highest (9% per quarter) when risk is 
measured as “index based measure”449 in the capital equation. These 9% are equivalent 
to an adjustment speed of 35% per year. This corresponds to the result from above.450  
The risk equation reveals adjustment speeds that are much smaller (between 1% and 
3% per quarter). The 3% are experienced in Model I and correlate to an adjustment of 
12% per year.451.  
The simultaneous equation shows the following results: in the first specification the 
speed of adjustment is again positive and significant. Additionally, the capital equation 
reveals a higher speed than the risk equation. The second specification gives more 
insights on how the speed of adjustment is related to the size of a bank’s capital buffer. 
In the capital equation it is discovered that banks with lower capital buffers (<2%) show 
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a higher adjustment speed. However, the same behaviour can not be found in the risk 
equation.452 
 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) find that the adjustment rate of capital ratios is 
different for the different measures of capital. The speed of the leverage ratio is only 
12%, whereas the adjustment rate for Tier I is 21% per year.453 Extending the basic 
regression model by regulatory policy factors leads to a small increase in the adjustment 
speed, 18% and 26% per year for leverage ratio and Tier I capital, respectively.454 
 
4.3.2 Means of Adjustment 
Higher capital requirements leave the manager with four possibilities in order to meet 
the required ratio: he can leave the industry, finance the gap with his own private 
capital, increase the capital or adjust the asset side via loan cuts. Hyun and Rhee (2011) 
only discuss the last two solutions. A bank values the two possibilities equally if it does 
not take into account any past records. This means that only in the case if 
creditworthiness of its customers or previous behaviour does not affect the decision than 
both options have the same value. This does not seem to be applicable to the real world 
since banks do care about the characteristics of their customers and the relationships. 
Losses are experienced anyway either through dilusion or less dividends due to lower 
profits caused by fewer loans on the book. Furthermore, dividends do decrease in either 
scenario for existing shareholders.455  
 
4.3.2.1 Adjusting the Asset Side 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) investigate further how the adjustments of capital ratios 
are done. The analysis is done with the variable “own funds”456. From the previous 
findings it can be recalled that 28 banks adjusted their capital ratio at the 10% 
significance level. This sample is further divided into banks that have a positive 
adjustment speed, which gives us 20 banks. Out of these 20 banks nine prove to have a 
positive and also significant relationship. Both subsamples show that the adjustment 
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rate of the asset side is higher than the one of the liability side. For the 20 banks the 
value is 2.46 times more elevated and for the nine banks it is 4.57 times. This means 
that in a situation of capital adjustment, banks are faster in adjusting the asset side 
(loans, risks, etc.).457 
 
Hyun and Rhee (2011) try to find explanations to understand why loan cutting and 
collection are banks’ first measures when restructuring their balance sheets in order to 
meet the capital requirements. They pick up the argument by Onado (2008) which says 
that additional equity is not considered along the way due to dilusion. It means that no 
additional capital is issued because this action would have an impact on shareholders’ 
voting rights and can potentially change them.458 Hyun and Rhee (2011) explore in their 
study if dilusion can explain banks’ behaviour. It seems intuitive that the existing 
shareholders will not vote for anything that might decrease their power which could 
make asset side adjustments the only way to meet the target capital ratios. In order for 
this statement to be valid managers have to act in line with shareholders’ preferences 
and the potential benefit of new shareholders is not allowed to affect the financing 
decision. The agency problem between managers and shareholders in banks has been 
discussed in the literature. It is supposed to be as valid for banks as it is for non-
financial institutions. Monitoring can be an incentive for the manager to behave in 
favour of the shareholders; increased monitoring can be put in place through boards, 
ownership structure and other measures. Since there seem to be possibilities to increase 
the compliance of managers the model of Hyun and Rhee (2011) considers managers to 
decide in the interest of shareholders. Furthermore, the model only takes the wealth of 
existing shareholders into account and states that managers act along this assumption. 
This means that new shareholders decrease value for the old shareholders, whereas loan 
cutting and collection does not trigger the same amount of loss, especially, if riskier 
loans are eliminated. High risk weighted-assets seem to be the first, which have to go 
during a restructuring process. Hyun and Rhee (2011) assume that issuing new equity is 
free.459 
A cut on the asset side leads to reduced dividend payments, but as already mentioned 
above the relative losses might be less in the loan cutting scenario. Additionally, taking 
off risk weighted-assets from the balance sheet is beneficial. Therefore, the projects 
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with the least net asset value will be cut. Since firms are cut that are rated with the 
highest probability of default, gains are relatively less reduced. This is especially, true 
in a state in which the economy is bad. In this case, the bank is able to prevent itself 
from defaulting loans through cutting them in the first place.460  After the crisis of 2007 
banks have needed to adjust their capital ratios, since they have suffered from enormous 
capital losses. The adaption of the ratios has been done by restructuring the asset side. 
Therefore, fewer loans have been issued and the outstanding ones have become due.461 
The literature explains it the following way: banks are mostly constraint in a bad 
economy. In those times taking on fresh equity is very costly. These costs are driven by 
time and the fact that the market is tight.462 The costs occur due to asymmetric 
information, signalling effects and so on. According to the Pecking Order Theory equity 
even is the last resort to be used in financing.463 
 
4.3.2.2 Adjusting the Liability Side 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) reveal in their subsample (as described above) the 
following results: the nine banks show that the liability side is responsible for 64.6% of 
the adjustment speed of the variable own funds. However, the liability side’s speed of 
adjustment is lower. These findings appoint more efficiency to the liability 
adjustments.464 
 
Hyun and Rhee (2011) suggest in their model that if banks are forced to stop long 
term lending the effects might be quite different. Giving up these loans simultaneously 
means forgoing future profits in the form of interest payments. The negative impact on 
the gains is defined by the number of cut loans and their amounts. Especially, when 
banks do not have bad loans on their balance sheet than the cutting of loans is not 
beneficial for them, because they do not profit from clearing their asset side from bad 
loans. Additionally, an increased interest rate has a negative relationship with the 
advantages of asset adjustments since it causes the bank to forgo future gains due to the 
fact that it has stopped lending. However, in cases in which the changes of the capital 
ratio are not big, the adjustment will be done by restructuring the asset side. Even in the 
                                                 
460
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event of equity being free of charge banks might not take on the deal because new 
equity always is costly in some ways to them, unless a bank has only long term loans on 
its book. In that case, the adjustment of capital ratios will be done through equity.465  
 
 
5 Empirical Evidence of European Banks  
5.1 Introduction 
First, I want to look at the capital structure and what factors do have an influence on 
it. This is done by analysing the equity ratios. Furthermore, the equity ratio is calculated 
in two ways: book and market values. 
Second, the Basel ratio is used in order to see which variables do influence it. 
Third, capital buffers are taken as dependent variables. I want to know if banks do 
hold more than the amount that is required by law. Moreover, in the next step the 
regression tests which factors do influence the additional amount of capital that is held.  
Last, I want to find out if the structure of bank financing has changed and which 
factors do have an impact on that structure. Therefore, I use the deposit ratio and within 
the analyses, again, book and market values. 
 
5.2 Dataset 
All the data used in this empirical part is extracted from the SNL database.466 
In the search mask I have checked the box to only look for listed European banks and 
for data that has been originally reported and actual. The sample period is from 2005 
until 2010. That search leads to a dataset of 225 banks. Not for all banks the information 
which I need for my regressions is available. After dropping all the banks without 
information on market capitalisation the sample includes 152 banks. Additionally, 
banks that do not report Tier 1 capital are eliminated, which reduces the sample to 112 
banks. Furthermore, banks that miss actual numbers on Tier 2 capital are taken out of 
the sample, which leaves 105 banks. Last, banks that do not have any information on 
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RWA (= risk weighted assets) are dropped, so that the final sample consists of 104 
banks. 
 
5.3 Variables 
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
One dependent variable is the equity ratio. First, it is calculated as book value of the 
equity over the book value of the total assets. The ratio is called “equity_ratio1”. The 
components needed are given as “total equity”467 and “total assets” 468 in the database. 
Moreover, the same variable is calculated in market values. It is named “equity_ratio2”. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the book value of debt is equal to the market value of debt. 
This is a rather big assumption but there was no information about the market value of 
debt in the database. As market value of equity “market capitalisation” 469 is used, which 
is given in SNL. 
The next variables are calculated according to the Basel agreement. These variables 
are given in the SNL database. The first dependent variable is “Basel_1”, which is Tier 
1 capital over total risk weighted assets (RWA). The second dependent variable in this 
category is “Basel_2” which is derived by taking (Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital) / RWA. 470 
In order to generate the ratios, which show how much additional capital is held, I look 
again at Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and RWA. First, I take Tier 1 capital over RWA minus 
4%. The four percent represent the amount required by the Basel 2 agreement. The 
variable is called “capital_buffer1”. The second variable is called “capital_buffer2”. I 
calculate ((Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / RWA) – 8%. Again, the minimum 
requirement is deducted in order to get the access capital held by banks.471 
Last, I want to see how banks finance themselves. This is done by looking at the 
deposit ratios over total assets. The variable is measured in book values and is called 
“deposit_ratio_BV”. As measure for deposits I have used “total deposits of 
customers”472 and for the denominator I take “total assets” 473 both variables are given in 
SNL. To calculate the variable “deposit_ratio_MV” (in market values) I use total 
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deposits of customers / (market capitalisation + book value of total debts). In order to 
find out the amount of other non-deposit financing, I just use 1 minus the deposit ratio, 
again for both book and market values the variables are called “non-deposit_ratio_BV” 
and “non-deposit_ratio_MV”, respectively.474 
 
5.3.2 Independent variables 
As independent variable I used size. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets.475  
Profitability is another variable that is supposed to have an influence on bank capital. 
It is measured as (pre-tax profit + interest expense) / book value of total assets.476 
Collateral is used to explain the dependent variables. To define collateral the 
following components are used (total securities + cash and equivalents + fixed assets) / 
book value of total assets. The variable is chosen this way, because this is the data 
available in SNL.477 
Liquidity is another variable and it is defined in two ways. Liquidity is calculated as 
(cash and equivalents + loans maturity < 3 months + loans maturity 3-12 months + net 
loans to banks) / book value of total assets. Many banks do not provide the information 
necessary in SNL. Therefore, another approach is used to define liquidity1 as (cash and 
equivalents + net loans to banks) / book value of total assets. This variable is easier to 
calculate, because the information needed is available.478 
The costs of funding are measured as return on equity (ROE). ROE is calculated as net 
profits over book value of total equity.479 
The riskiness of a bank and its assets also play an important role. Risk is defined as 
net loans to customers over book value of total assets.480 
Furthermore, the market value to book value (MVBV) is included. A higher ratio can 
mean easier access to the capital market, which can be translated in a lower cost of 
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raising equity. The variable is defined as MVBV calculated by taking 
(market_capitalisation+ total_debt)/ (total_equity + total_debt).481 
Last, dummy variables for each year are defined. 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 35: Country distribution 
Country Frequence Percent Number of banks 
Austria 24 3.85 4 
Belgium 6 0.96 1 
Czech Republic 6 0.96 1 
Denmark 102 16.35 17 
Finland 12 1.92 2 
France 18 2.88 3 
Germany 24 3.85 4 
Greece 18 2.88 3 
Greenland 6 0.96 1 
Hungary 12 1.92 2 
Ireland 12 1.92 2 
Italy 102 16.35 17 
Liechtenstein 6 0.96 1 
Netherlands 6 0.96 1 
Norway 84 13.46 14 
Poland 12 1.92 2 
Portugal 18 2.88 3 
Spain 42 6.73 7 
Sweden 24 3.85 4 
Switzerland 24 3.85 4 
Turkey 30 4.81 5 
United Kingdom 36 5.77 6 
 Based on data from SNL 
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Table 36: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
deposit_ratio_MV 620 2.0235 1.6352 0 20.2688 
non_deposit_ratio_MV 620 -1.0235 1.6352 -19.2688 1 
deposit_ratio_BV 621 .4977 .16248 0 .8905 
non_deposit_ratio_BV 621 .5023 .16248 .1095 1 
Basel_1 624 .1089 .04603 .0093 .5486 
Basel_2 624 .1373 .04248 .0133 .5740 
equity_ratio1 624 .0777 .04444 .0145 .4727 
equity_ratio2 623 .3433 .28434 .0063 1 
capital_buffer1 624 .0689 .04603 -.0307 .5086 
capital_buffer2 624 .0573 .04248 -.0667  .4940 
Size 624 16.9344 2.5199 11.1728 21.6421 
Profit 624 .0356 .02066 -.0641 .2251 
Collateral 616 .2499 .1468 .0144 .8197 
Liquidity 507 .2912 .1203 .0350 1.0374 
liquidity1 622 .1048 .0782 .0037 .6242 
ROE 624 .0082 .0111 -.0700 .1812 
Risk 624 .6270 .1712 .1134 .9442 
MVBV 623 1.1345 .4135 .5088 4.9862 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The correlations are derived in Stata with the command pwcorr which means that the 
table reports partial correlations. Furthermore, the star (*) indicates that the value is 
significant at the 5% level. It can already be seen that size is significantly related with 
every variable. Additionally, ROE is also significantly related but the relationship seems 
to be less clear. 
Furthermore, the table reveals that liquidity and liquidity1 are highly correlated. Due 
to this correlation two different regressions are derived, each using one of the measures 
for liquidity. One regression accounts for liquidity and the other one for liquitiy1, while 
all other variables are unchanged. The regressions that are performed with the liquidity1 
variable are marked with a (2) in the name of the table. 
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Table 37: Correlations 
equity_
ratio1
equity_
ratio2 Basel_1 Basel_2
capital_
buffer1
capital_
buffer2
deposit_
MV
non-
deposit_
MV
deposit_
BV
non-
deposit_
BV size profit collateral liquidity liquidity1 ROE risk MVBV
equity_ratio1 1.000
equity_ratio2 0.6452* 1.0000 
0.0000
Basel_1 0.7388* 0.3834* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000
Basel_2 0.6394* 0.2926* 0.9237* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
capital_buffer1 0.7388* 0.3834* 1.0000* 0.9237* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
capital_buffer2 0.6394* 0.2926* 0.9237* 1.0000* 0.9237* 1.0000 
 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000   0.0000
deposit_MV  0.1555* 0.4569* 0.0387 -0.0334 0.0387 -0.0334 1.0000 
 0.0001 0.0000 0.3356 0.4066 0.3356 0.4066
non-deposit_MV -0.1555* -0.4569* -0.0387 0.0334 -0.0387 0.0334 -1.0000*  1.0000 
0.0001 0.0000 0.3356 0.4066 0.3356 0.4066 0.0000
deposit_BV 0.4057* 0.6223* 0.1616* 0.0609 0.1616* 0.0609  0.6186* -0.6186* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.1292 0.0001 0.1292 0.0000
non-deposit_BV -0.4057* -0.6223* -0.1616* -0.0609 -0.1616* -0.0609 -0.6186* 0.6186* -1.0000* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.1292 0.0001 0.1292 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
size -0.5734* -0.4575* -0.3697* -0.2420* -0.3697* -0.2420* -0.3520* 0.3520* -0.5640* 0.5640* 1.0000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
profit 0.3067* 0.1706* 0.2768* 0.2360* 0.2768* 0.2360*  -0.1859* 0.1859* 0.0107 -0.0107 -0.1480* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7896 0.7896 0.0002
collateral -0.1343*  -0.0298 0.1190* 0.2316* 0.1190* 0.2316* -0.0852* 0.0852* -0.2869* 0.2869* 0.4767* -0.0075 1.0000 
0.0008 0.4600 0.0031 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0350 0.0350 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8533
liquidity 0.1235* 0.3381* 0.1212* 0.1019* 0.1212* 0.1019* 0.0957* -0.0957* 0.0984* -0.0984* -0.0740 0.2418* -0.0838 1.0000 
0.0054 0.0000 0.0063 0.0217 0.0063 0.0217 0.0314  0.0314 0.0269 0.0269 0.0959 0.0000 0.0609
liquidity1 0.1291* 0.2760* 0.1674* 0.1394* 0.1674* 0.1394* 0.0383 -0.0383 -0.0273 0.0273 -0.0526 0.2030* -0.0639 0.6178* 1.0000 
0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.3415 0.3415 0.4984 0.4984 0.1905 0.0000 0.1139 0.0000
ROE 0.4972* 0.4019* 0.3687* 0.3145* 0.3687* 0.3145* -0.1212* 0.1212* 0.1531* -0.1531* -0.1944* 0.7157* -0.0232 0.1541* 0.1158* 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.5657 0.0005 0.0038
risk 0.0783 -0.0334 -0.1729*  -0.2786* -0.1729* -0.2786* 0.1344* -0.1344* 0.3954* -0.3954* -0.4989* -0.0334 -0.8503* -0.2042* -0.3785* -0.0108  1.0000 
0.0506 0.4050 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4050 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.7878
MVBV 0.2588* 0.6383*  0.1749* 0.1331* 0.1749* 0.1331* -0.0572 0.0572 0.2974*  -0.2974* -0.0927* 0.2169* 0.0272 0.2540* 0.2547*  0.3856* -0.1155*  1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0009 0.1550 0.1550 0.0000 0.0000 0.0206 0.0000 0.5009 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000   0.0039
 
 Based on data from SNL 
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5.5 Results 
All the regressions are done in the Stata program. At the end of each regression there 
is written an “r” this is done to make the results robust against heteroscedasticity. The t-
statistics are given in parentheses, the stars represent the significance and are defined 
the following way:  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.5.1 OLS regressions 
5.5.1.1 Equity ratio 
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Figure 1: Development of the equity_ratio1 
Based on data from SNL 
 
It can be seen that the equity ratio has been rather constant over time. However, there 
is a drop of approximately 2 percent in 2008. This could be explained by the financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, it appears as if by 2010 the banks have managed to compensate 
their losses with fresh capital. 
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Figure 2: Development of equity_ratio2 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Looking at the equity ratio2, which is the ratio in market values, paints a different 
picture. The ratio peaked in 2006 then has started dropping in 2007 and has reached a 
low in 2008. However, the ratio has not recovered yet. On the contrary, it seems to be 
weaker in 2010 than it was in 2009 and it is far away from the all-time high in 2006. 
These observations are true for the mean and the median. 
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Table 38: Equity ratio OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 equity_ratio1 equity_ratio2 
size -0.0117*** -0.0604*** 
 
(-7.70) (-13.81) 
 
  
profit -0.227* -4.053*** 
 
(-1.76) (-6.02) 
 
  
collateral -0.0282 0.421*** 
 
(-0.69) (3.40) 
 
  
liquidity -0.00956 0.507*** 
 
(-0.54) (6.26) 
 
  
ROE 1.810*** 7.884*** 
 
(3.47) (4.14) 
 
  
risk -0.0923* -0.104 
 
(-1.81) (-0.86) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00699 0.316*** 
 (1.55) (6.63) 
   
_cons 0.340*** 0.890*** 
 (4.93) (5.18) 
N 501 501 
R2 0.556 0.670 
Table 39: Equity ratio (2) OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 equity_ratio1 equity_ratio2 
size -0.0115*** -0.0533*** 
 
(-8.09) (-11.73) 
 
  
profit -0.177 -4.091*** 
 
(-1.61) (-6.07) 
 
  
collateral -0.136*** 0.494*** 
 
(-2.75) (2.66) 
 
  
liquidity1 -0.138*** 0.688*** 
 
(-3.00) (3.34) 
 
  
ROE 1.812*** 8.348*** 
 
(3.70) (4.14) 
 
  
risk -0.186*** 0.103 
 
(-3.21) (0.53) 
 
  
MVBV 0.0113** 0.345*** 
 (2.56) (7.35) 
   
_cons 0.407*** 0.655*** 
 (5.48) (2.76) 
N 613 613 
R2 0.569 0.647 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Attention should be drawn to the variable size. It is negative and significant in both 
regressions. These findings are in line with the findings by other authors mentioned 
earlier in the paper.482 It means that larger banks tend to hold less capital.  
Profit is negatively related, which contradicts the findings of Kleff and Weber 
(2008)483, Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008)484 and the work of Flannery and 
Rangan (2008)485. The findings are significant for the equity_ratio1 and highly 
significant (at the 1% level) for the equity_ratio2. 
The variable collateral reveals contradicting findings. However, only the positive 
relationship in the equity_ratio2 is significant.  
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The liquidity variable experiences a negative and a positive relationship, but is only 
significant in the equity_ratio2 regression. In that regression the significance is very 
high and the relationship is positive. 
ROE, however, is significantly positively related. This can be explained by theory, 
which indicates that the more expensive capital is the more banks will hold in order to 
be prepared for bad times. 
Risk is negatively correlated with the equity ratios. This seems to be similar to the 
findings of Kleff and Weber (2008)486. However, the variable risk is only significant for 
the book value regression.  
Last, MVBV is positively related with the equity ratios. Nevertheless, the market 
value regression is the only one of significance, but it is significant at a high level (1%).  
 
Running the regressions with the liquidity1 variable leads to the following results: 
Size has not changed. 
Profit is no longer significant in the equity_ratio1 regression, but still negative and 
significant for the equity_ratio2. 
Collateral is again twofold significant, however, this time the high significance is 
related to the positive and the negative sign. Therefore, the variable does not seem to be 
robust. 
Measuring liquidity1 reveals highly significant relationships. It is negative for the 
equity_ratio1 and positive for the equity_ratio2. Again, the variable misses robustness. 
ROE has not changed. 
Risk is now negatively and positively related. However, the result is only significant 
for the negative relationship with the equity_ratio1. 
Now, MVBV is also significant in the equity_ratio1 regression but only at a 5% level. 
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5.5.1.2 Basel ratio 
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Figure 3: Development of Basel_1 ratio 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The ratio has always been not even close to the minimum threshold of 4%. This fact 
will become even more obvious if looking at the capital buffer graphs. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that the Basel ratio has experienced a decline in the years 2007 and 2008. 
However, in 2010 it is stronger than ever before and peaks at almost 12%.  
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Figure 4: Development of Basel_2 ratio 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The Basel_2 graph shows a quite similar behaviour. There is a decline in the ratio in 
2007 and 2008. However, the decline is not as sharp as it is in the Basel_1 graph. 
Moreover, this ratio has never been close to the minimum threshold of 8%. 
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Additionally, it is highest in 2010, which has been observed with the Basel_1 variable 
too. 
 
Table 40: Basel ratio OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Basel_1 Basel_2 
size -0.0103*** -0.00795*** 
 
(-7.17) (-5.89) 
 
  
profit 0.285** 0.162 
 
(2.28) (1.37) 
 
  
collateral -0.00332 0.0253 
 
(-0.09) (0.67) 
 
  
liquidity -0.00952 -0.00738 
 
(-0.39) (-0.29) 
 
  
ROE 0.781** 0.680* 
 
(1.99) (1.85) 
 
  
risk -0.111** -0.104** 
 
(-2.22) (-2.15) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00447 -0.000504 
 (0.80) (-0.09) 
   
_cons 0.355*** 0.336*** 
 (5.47) (5.37) 
N 501 501 
R2 0.460 0.385 
Table 41: Basel ratio (2) OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Basel_1 Basel_2 
size -0.0104*** -0.00840*** 
 
(-6.37) (-5.28) 
 
  
profit 0.322** 0.273** 
 
(2.33) (2.06) 
 
  
collateral -0.0924 -0.0853 
 
(-1.03) (-0.95) 
 
  
liquidity1 -0.125 -0.145 
 
(-1.35) (-1.54) 
 
  
ROE 0.886** 0.705** 
 
(2.31) (2.05) 
 
  
risk -0.208** -0.216** 
 
(-2.09) (-2.16) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00836 0.00308 
 (1.28) (0.47) 
   
_cons 0.413*** 0.427*** 
 (3.70) (3.84) 
N 613 613 
R2 0.452 0.380 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The conducted regressions with the variable liquidity show the following results.  
Size is negatively related and significant for both regressions. This means that the 
bigger the banks the lower are the respective Basel ratios. 
Profit is significantly positively related. However, the relationship with the Basel_2 
ratio is not significant. This outcome is contradicting the theory because a more 
profitable bank would be expected to have lower capital ratios. 
The relationship of collateral is twofold but insignificant in both cases. 
The results of liquidity are negative, but insignificant. 
ROE is positively related with Basel_1 and Basel_2. The results are only significant at 
the 5% level for the Basel_1 regression and at 10% for the Basel_2 regression. 
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The variable risk is negatively related, which means the less risk the higher the Basel 
ratios. This is not predicted by theory. However, the results are significant at the 5% 
level for both regressions. 
MVBV is twofold related but insignificant in both regressions. 
 
Replacing liquidity with the liquidity1 ratio leads to the following findings. 
Size is unchanged. 
Now, profit is also significant at the 10% level and positive related with the Basel_2 
regression. 
Collateral is no longer twofold but only negatively related in both equations. 
However, these findings are insignificant. 
Liquidity1 is negatively related but lacks significance.  
ROE is almost unchanged with the exception that the Basel_2 regression shows a 
higher significance (5%) in this regression. 
The direction and significance of risk is unchanged. 
In this regression MVBV is positively related but insignificant. 
 
5.5.1.3 Capital buffer ratio 
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Figure 5: Development of capital buffer1 
Based on data from SNL 
 
As in the previous graphs of the equity ratio the capital_buffer1 shows a decline in the 
amount of capital held as buffer against bad times in 2007 and 2008. However, in this 
graph it becomes even more obvious how much additional capital has been taken on in 
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the years of 2009 and 2010. The buffer peaks at 8% in 2010, which is twice as much as 
required by the original Basel regulation. 
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Figure 6: Development of capital_buffer2 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The capital_buffer2 ratio just reveals again what has already been previously 
mentioned: first, the decline in 2007 and 2008 and second, the significant stock of 
capital that has been taken on in the years of 2009 and 2010. These numbers also 
strongly point out that there has always been more capital than required by the 
regulators. 
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Table 42: Capital buffer ratio OLS 
regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 capital_buffer1 capital_buffer2 
size -0.0103*** -0.00795*** 
 
(-7.17) (-5.89) 
 
  
profit 0.285** 0.162 
 
(2.28) (1.37) 
 
  
collateral -0.00332 0.0253 
 
(-0.09) (0.67) 
 
  
liquidity -0.00952 -0.00738 
 
(-0.39) (-0.29) 
 
  
ROE 0.781** 0.680* 
 
(1.99) (1.85) 
 
  
risk -0.111** -0.104** 
 
(-2.22) (-2.15) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00447 -0.000504 
 (0.80) (-0.09) 
   
_cons 0.315*** 0.256*** 
 (4.85) (4.09) 
N 501 501 
R2 0.460 0.385 
Table 43: Capital buffer ratio (2) OLS 
regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 capital_buffer1 capital_buffer2 
size -0.0104*** -0.00840*** 
 
(-6.37) (-5.28) 
 
  
profit 0.322** 0.273** 
 
(2.33) (2.06) 
 
  
collateral -0.0924 -0.0853 
 
(-1.03) (-0.95) 
 
  
liquidity1 -0.125 -0.145 
 
(-1.35) (-1.54) 
 
  
ROE 0.886** 0.705** 
 
(2.31) (2.05) 
 
  
risk -0.208** -0.216** 
 
(-2.09) (-2.16) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00836 0.00308 
 (1.28) (0.47) 
   
_cons 0.373*** 0.347*** 
 (3.34) (3.12) 
N 613 613 
R2 0.452 0.380 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Size is negatively related and significant for both regressions that include liquidity. 
These findings are in line with Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010)487, Schaeck and Cihák 
(2010)488 and others489 who have already been mentioned before. This means that the 
bigger the banks are the less buffer capital is held. Therefore, size acts as a substitute for 
capital buffer. 
The variable profit reveals a positive relationship. It is only significant in the 
capital_buffer1 regression. This result contradicts the findings of Jokipii and Milne 
(2008).490 
                                                 
487
 Fonseca and González (2010) p.899 
488
 Schaeck and Cihák (2010) p.13 
489
 Lindquist (2004) p.505-509; Jokipii and Milne (2011) p.173-174; Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008) p.19; Stolz and Wedow (2011) p.103 
490
 Jokipii and Milne (2008) p.1447 
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Collateral shows a twofold relationship. Nevertheless, none of theses findings are 
significant. 
The findings of liquidity are negative but insignificant. 
ROE has a positive relationship with both dependent variables but the significance is 
not very high (5% for the capital_buffer1 variable and 10% for the capital_buffer2 
variable). This is in line with the findings of Fonseca and Gonzãlez (2010)491. 
The variable risk is negative in both regressions and significant at 5%. 
MVBV is twofold related but lacks of significance in both regressions. 
 
In the regressions with the liquidity1 variable the following changes occur. 
Size is unchanged. 
However, profit is significant at 5% in both regressions and still positively related. 
Nevertheless, collateral does no longer experience a twofold relationship. Now, it is 
only negatively, but insignificantly related. 
The results of ROE do not change much, only the significance in the capital_buffer2 
relation has increased to 5%. 
Risk has remained unchanged. 
MVBV has lost the twofold relationship and is only positively related, but still 
insignificant in both regressions. 
 
 
                                                 
491
 Fonseca and González (2010) p.893 
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5.5.1.4 Deposit ratio 
deposit_ratio_BV
0,475
0,480
0,485
0,490
0,495
0,500
0,505
0,510
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Year
Si
z
e Mean
Median
 
Figure 7: Development of deposit_ratio_BV 
Based on data from SNL 
 
At first this graph seems to indicate a high drop in relative deposits in the years 2006, 
2007 and 2008. However, looking at the percentages the decline is less severe. The 
mean difference in relative deposits between 2005 and 2008 is only 1.5%. Additionally, 
the median deposit ratio has even increased from 2006 to 2010. These results indicate 
that the source of financing has not substantially changed over the years. 
It is difficult to interpret these results. It can mean that due to deposit insurance 
depositors are willing to leave their money within banks even in the case of a crisis. On 
the other hand, it can indicate that deposits have decreased but so has the equity, 
therefore, the relative ratio is still constant. However, that graph does not tell the 
reasons why the relative deposit ratio is rather stable. 
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Figure 8: Development of deposit_ratio_MV 
Based on data from SNL 
 
What can be seen is that the values are over one, which means that they are over 
100%. This indicates that the numerator is higher than the denominator, which 
explicitly says that the value of deposits is higher than the market value of the bank. 
This variable has to be interpreted with caution. Equity is the only component that is 
measured in actual market values in this ratio; deposits are still measured in book values 
due to a lack of data. 
However, it can be seen that until 2008 the deposits have been rather stable and have 
augmented starting in 2008. The incline is higher in the mean than the median variable. 
The increase could be a result of a drop in equity (measured in market values). 
Additionally, a higher number of deposits could be responsible for this result or a 
decrease in debt. In this case, the reason can not be exactly identified from the graph. 
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Table 44: Deposit ratio OLS regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 deposit_ratio_MV deposit_ratio_BV 
size -0.286*** -0.0300*** 
 
(-9.44) (-13.76) 
 
  
profit -28.98*** -1.613*** 
 
(-6.89) (-2.68) 
 
  
collateral 3.753*** 0.525*** 
 
(4.69) (4.54) 
 
  
liquidity 2.943*** 0.247*** 
 
(4.57) (4.09) 
 
  
ROE 20.16*** 1.902** 
 
(2.60) (2.05) 
 
  
risk 1.797** 0.585*** 
 
(2.33) (5.69) 
 
  
MVBV -0.163 0.124*** 
 (-0.98) (6.63) 
   
_cons 4.590*** 0.316*** 
 (4.24) (2.63) 
N 500 500 
R2 0.338 0.496 
Table 45: Deposit ratio (2) OLS regressions 
 (1) (2) 
 deposit_ratio_MV deposit_ratio_BV 
size -0.250*** -0.0257*** 
 
(-8.27) (-11.54) 
 
  
profit -31.41*** -2.064*** 
 
(-7.44) (-3.55) 
 
  
collateral 6.274*** 0.836*** 
 
(5.04) (6.44) 
 
  
liquidity1 7.118*** 0.712*** 
 
(5.05) (4.24) 
 
  
ROE 20.69** 2.644*** 
 
(2.04) (2.80) 
 
  
risk 5.053*** 0.948*** 
 
(4.09) (7.43) 
 
  
MVBV -0.0663 0.123*** 
 (-0.46) (6.96) 
   
_cons 1.329 -0.0601 
 (0.89) (-0.42) 
N 610 610 
R2 0.277 0.503 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Four regressions have been set up with four dependent variables. Only the deposit 
ratios are reported, once in book values and once in market values. It seems quite 
intuitive that, since the non_deposit ratio is 1 minus the deposit ratio, the influence of 
the independent variables is the same with just the sign changed. 
 
Size does have a negative and significant impact on both deposit ratios. This indicates 
that larger banks are less deposit financed. These findings contradict Gropp and Heider 
(2010)492. Therefore, the role of size does not seem to be so clear.  
However, the negative and significant relationship between profits and deposits 
supports the work done by Gropp and Heider (2010)493.  
                                                 
492
 Gropp and Heider (2010) p.597-599 
493
 Gropp and Heider (2010) p.597-599 
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The variable collateral is positively and highly significantly related with deposits. This 
is in line with Gropp and Heider (2010)494. 
The outcome for liquidity is a significantly (at 1%) positive relationship in both 
regressions. The higher the liquidity the higher the deposit ratio, this is in line with the 
theory of Diamond and Rajan (2000) who predict more equity for more illiquidity.495 
ROE is positively and significantly related with both deposit_ratios but only highly 
statistically significant for the deposit_ratio_MV. This result seems intuitive. The more 
costly it gets to take on additional equity, the more banks are financed via deposits. 
Moreover, risk has also a highly significant and positive impact on deposits. This 
means that the riskier a bank the more deposit financing it is experiencing. These results 
are contradicting the findings of Gropp and Heider (2010)496. 
The variable MVBV is twofold related: negatively with the deposit_ratio_MV and 
positively with the deposit_ratio_BV. However, only in the second case statistic 
significance is given. These results are not in line with Gropp and Heider (2010), who 
report negative relations and significance in the case of deposit_ratio_MV.497 
 
Using liquidity1 instead of liquidity leads to the following results. 
Size and profit are unchanged and therefore, still highly negatively related with the 
deposit ratios. 
The positive relationships of collateral and liquidity1 at a 1% significance level are 
unchanged. 
ROE continues to be positively related with the dependent variables. Nevertheless, the 
significance does differ a little bit. In these regressions the deposit_ratio_BV is highly 
significant (1%), whereas the deposit_ratio_MV shows only a 5% significance level. 
Risk is positively related and in comparison to before, this time it is significant at 1% 
for both ratios.  
Last, MVBV shows the same twofold results. Again, only the positive relationship in 
the depost_ratio_BV regression is significant (1%), 
 
5.5.2 Panel regressions 
Panel regressions can be used to account for unobserved heterogeneity.  
                                                 
494
 Gropp and Heider (2010) p.597-599 
495
 Diamond and Rajan (2000) p.2444 
496
 Gropp and Heider (2010) p.601-602 
497
 Gropp and Heider (2010) p.597-599 
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First, the differences between the two panel regressions with liquidity and liquitidy1 
are discussed. Second, the analyses focus on the results that differ from the OLS 
regressions. Therefore, the OLS regression and the panel regression are compared.  
5.5.2.1 Equity ratio 
Table 46: Equity ratio panel regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 equity_ratio1 equity_ratio2 
size -0.0157*** -0.0977** 
 
(-3.17) (-2.50) 
 
  
profit -0.125 -1.449** 
 
(-1.43) (-2.10) 
 
  
collateral -0.0181 0.0734 
 
(-0.88) (0.45) 
 
  
liquidity -0.000925 0.177*** 
 
(-0.12) (2.85) 
 
  
ROE 0.753*** 2.737*** 
 
(6.86) (3.16) 
 
  
risk 0.00502 0.354** 
 
(0.27) (2.37) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00276 0.173*** 
 (1.23) (9.76) 
   
_cons 0.335*** 1.555** 
 (4.01) (2.35) 
N 501 501 
R2 0.351 0.577 
Table 47: Equity ratio (2) panel regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Equity_ratio1 equity_ratio2 
size -0.0198*** -0.0949*** 
 
(-4.77) (-3.20) 
 
  
profit -0.178** -0.907* 
 
(-2.31) (-1.65) 
 
  
collateral 0.0108 0.293* 
 
(0.51) (1.93) 
 
  
liquidity1 0.00735 0.561*** 
 
(0.36) (3.81) 
 
  
ROE 0.820*** 2.394*** 
 
(8.13) (3.32) 
 
  
risk 0.0370* 0.610*** 
 
(1.73) (4.00) 
 
  
MVBV -0.00166 0.144*** 
 (-0.82) (9.86) 
   
_cons 0.393*** 1.259** 
 (5.22) (2.34) 
N 613 613 
R2 0.310 0.565 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
The regression that uses liquidity reveals the following results. 
Size is significantly and negatively related with both equity ratios. However, the 
significance is not the same (1% for the equity_ratio1 and 5% for the equity_ratio2). 
Profit experiences a negative relationship, but is only significant for the equity_ratio2 
(5%). 
Collateral is twofold related but insignificant in both cases. 
Liquidity shows a negative and a positive relationship but is only significant (at 1%) 
for the equity_ratio2, that is positively related. 
ROE has a highly (1%) significant and positive correlation with both equity ratios. 
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Risk has a positive relationship with both ratios, but is only significant for the 
equity_ratio2 (5%). 
MVBV shows a positive relationship, however, just the equity_ratio2 experiences 
significance (1%). 
 
Using liquiditiy1 instead of liquidity reveals the following results. 
Size is again negatively related. However, this time the relationship is significant at 
1% for both ratios. 
Profit is again negatively connected with both ratios. Nevertheless, the significance 
has changed. The equity_ratio1 is significant (at 5%) now, whereas the significance of 
the equity_ratio2 has dropped to 10% 
Collateral is no longer twofold related. However, only the positive relationship with 
the equity_ratio2 is significant (at 10%). 
Liquidity1 is not twofold related. It has a positive relationship, that is only significant 
for the equity_ratio2 at 1%. 
The relationship and the significance of ROE have not changed. 
Risk is still positively related but has increased in significance to 10% for the 
equity_ratio1 and to 1% for the equity_ratio2. 
Now, MVBV experiences a positive and a negative relationship. Again, only the 
positive relationship with the equity_ratio2 is highly significant (1%). 
 
Differences between the OLS and the panel regressions 
The direction of size does not change and it is significant at a 1% level for the 
equity_ratio1 but no longer for the equity_ratio2 (only 5%). 
Compared to the normal OLS regression the panel shows a lower significance for 
profit. The negative relationship is no longer significant for the equity_ratio1 and only 
significant at 5% in the equity_ratio2 regression. 
Furthermore, collateral has lost all its significance. Therefore, its twofold relationship 
is not a problem.  
Liquidity is unchanged. 
ROE is still the same (positive and significant at the 1% level). 
Risk is in the panel regression positively related. However, only the result of the 
equity_ratio1 is significant (5%). 
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MVBV has the same direction and significance (for the equity2 ratio) as in the OLS 
regression. 
 
Analysing the regressions with the variable liquidity1 presents the following outcome. 
Size has the same significance and direction as in the regression that uses liquidity.  
Profit is still negatively related with both equity ratios. Nevertheless, it loses 
significance (10%) for the equity_ratio2. However, it gains significance for the 
equity_ratio1 (5%). 
Collateral no longer reveals a twofold relationship now, but only the positive 
relationship with the equity_ratio2 is significant at 10%. Compared to the OLS 
regression this correlation is less significant. 
Liquidity1 is positively related with both dependent variables but only significant for 
the equity_ratio2 (at 1%). 
ROE has the same direction and significance as in the graph before. 
Risk is no longer twofold related. Now it is only positively related and it reveals 
significance (equity_ratio1 at 10% and equity_ratio2 at 1%). 
MVBV shows a twofold relationship, but the result is again only significant for the 
positive relationship with the equity_ratio2 (1%). 
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5.5.2.2 Basel ratio 
Table 48: Basel ratio panel regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Basel_1 Basel_2 
size -0.0400*** -0.0351*** 
 
(-4.50) (-3.47) 
 
  
profit 0.0864 0.00295 
 
(0.55) (0.02) 
 
  
collateral 0.0549 0.0783* 
 
(1.48) (1.86) 
 
  
liquidity -0.0146 -0.00872 
 
(-1.03) (-0.54) 
 
  
ROE 0.181 0.139 
 
(0.92) (0.62) 
 
  
risk -0.0871** -0.0648* 
 
(-2.56) (-1.68) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00602 0.00553 
 (1.49) (1.21) 
   
_cons 0.800*** 0.732*** 
 (5.31) (4.27) 
N 501 501 
R2 0.280 0.178 
  Table 49: Basel ratio (2) panel regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Basel_1 Basel_2 
size -0.0336*** -0.0291*** 
 
(-4.24) (-3.23) 
 
  
profit 0.158 0.206 
 
(1.08) (1.24) 
 
  
collateral -0.0986** -0.136*** 
 
(-2.43) (-2.94) 
 
  
liquidity1 -0.110*** -0.184*** 
 
(-2.80) (-4.12) 
 
  
ROE 0.237 0.0594 
 
(1.23) (0.27) 
 
  
risk -0.237*** -0.289*** 
 
(-5.81) (-6.23) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00772** 0.00560 
 (1.98) (1.27) 
   
_cons 0.869*** 0.868*** 
 (6.04) (5.31) 
N 613 613 
R2 0.275 0.202 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
    t statistics in parentheses 
    The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Size is significantly (1%) and negatively related. 
Profit shows a positive, but insignificant relationship. 
Collateral is positively related but only significant (at 10%) for the Basel_2 ratio. 
Liquidity has a negative, but insignificant relationship. 
ROE is positively correlated, however, it lacks of significance. 
Risk shows a negative relationship. Nevertheless, the significance is 5% for the 
Basel_1 ratio and 10% for the Basel_2 ratio. 
The variable MVBV is positive, but insignificant. 
 
The analyses of the regressions with liquidity1 lead to the following outcome. 
Again, size is highly significantly and negatively related. 
Profit has not changed. 
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Now, collateral experiences a negative relationship. Moreover, the results are 
significant at 5% for the Basel_1 ratio and at 1% for the Basel_2 ratio. That outcome 
could indicate that the variable is not robust. 
Liquidity1 is negatively related too. The significance is 1% for both ratios. 
ROE is unchanged. 
Risk has again a negative relationship; however, the significance has increased to 1% 
for both Basel ratios. 
The direction (positive) of MVBV has not changes. Nevertheless, the relationship is 
significant at 5% for the Basel_1 ratio now. 
 
Differences between the OLS and the panel regressions 
Size is unchanged. 
Profit is no longer significant. 
Collateral shows only a positive relationship, which contradicts the theory, but this 
outcome is just significant for the Basel_2 ratio (10%).  
The variable liquidity has still a negative sign, but is insignificant. 
ROE is no longer significant in both regressions. 
In the panel regressions risk loses significance in the Basel_2 regression and is 
significant at the 10% level now. 
MVBV is no longer twofold related but still insignificant in both regressions. 
 
Using liquidity1 instead of liquidity does not change the sign and significance of the 
variable size. 
Profit loses all significance. 
However, collateral is again negatively related, but the findings are significant (5% for 
the Basel_1 ratio and 1% for the Basel_2 ratio) now. 
Liquidity1 is negatively related and in those two cases highly significant (1%). 
The positive relationship of the variable ROE is unchanged, but has lost all 
significance. 
Risk is still negatively related, but has increased to 1% significance.  
MVBV does not change direction in the panel regressions, but gains significance (5%) 
in the Basel_1 regression. 
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5.5.2.3 Capital buffer ratio 
Table 50: Capital buffer ratio panel 
regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 capital_buffer1 capital_buffer2 
size -0.0400*** -0.0351*** 
 
(-4.50) (-3.47) 
 
  
profit 0.0864 0.00295 
 
(0.55) (0.02) 
 
  
collateral 0.0549 0.0783* 
 
(1.48) (1.86) 
 
  
liquidity -0.0146 -0.00872 
 
(-1.03) (-0.54) 
 
  
ROE 0.181 0.139 
 
(0.92) (0.62) 
 
  
risk -0.0871** -0.0648* 
 
(-2.56) (-1.68) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00602 0.00553 
 (1.49) (1.21) 
   
_cons 0.760*** 0.652*** 
 (5.05) (3.81) 
N 501 501 
Table 51: Capital buffer ratio (2) panel 
regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 capital_buffer1 capital_buffer2 
size -0.0336*** -0.0291*** 
 
(-4.24) (-3.23) 
 
  
profit 0.158 0.206 
 
(1.08) (1.24) 
 
  
collateral -0.0986** -0.136*** 
 
(-2.43) (-2.94) 
 
  
liquidity1 -0.110*** -0.184*** 
 
(-2.80) (-4.12) 
 
  
ROE 0.237 0.0594 
 
(1.23) (0.27) 
 
  
risk -0.237*** -0.289*** 
 
(-5.81) (-6.23) 
 
  
MVBV 0.00772** 0.00560 
 (1.98) (1.27) 
   
_cons 0.829*** 0.788*** 
 (5.76) (4.82) 
N 613 613 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Size is negatively and significantly (1%) related. 
Profit has a positive, but insignificant relationship. 
Collateral is positively correlated. Nevertheless, only the capital_buffer2 ratio is 
significant (at 10%). 
Liquidity has a negative and insignificant relationship with both ratios. 
ROE is positively related. However, the results are not significant. 
Risk has a negative relationship, but differs in significance. The capital_buffer1 ratio 
is significant at 5%, the significance of the capital_buffer2 ratio drops to 10%. 
MVBV is positively correlated, but the results lack significance. 
 
The regressions with the variable liquidity1 show the following results. 
Size and profit have not changed. 
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Now, collateral is negatively related. The significance is 5% for the capital_buffer1 
ratio and even higher (1%) for the capital buffer2 ratio. This could indicate that the 
variable is not very robust. 
Liquidity1 also has a negative relationship. Moreover, both regressions are significant at 
1%. 
ROE has not changed. 
Risk is negatively related, but has increased in significance to 1% for both regressions. 
MVBV experiences a positive relationship. However, only the capital_buffer1 ratio is 
significant (5%). 
 
Differences between the OLS and the panel regressions 
In the panel regressions size is again negative and highly significant. 
Profit is no longer significant in both regressions. 
The variable collateral is now positively related with the capital buffer ratios but only 
significant (at 10%) for the capital_buffer2 ratio. 
Now, liquidity is negatively related too, but still insignificant. 
Furthermore, ROE loses the significance in both regressions. 
Risk becomes less significant in the regression capital_buffer2 (10%), but is still 
negatively related. 
MVBV does not longer experience a twofold relationship, but the positive relationship 
with both dependent variables is still insignificant. 
 
Using liquidity1 in the regressions leads to the following results. 
Size is still highly negatively related (1% significance).  
Profit does not change direction, but is insignificant now. 
The variable collateral still experiences a negative relationship. Furthermore, the 
results become significant (5% for the capital_buffer1 ratio and 1% for the 
capital_buffer2 ratio). 
Moreover, liquidity1 has gained high significance (1%), but is still negatively related. 
ROE remains unchanged as far as the relationship is concerned (positive), but loses all 
significance. 
The variable risk is still negatively related. However, the significance has increased to 
1% for both regressions. 
Now, MVBV is significantly positively related with the capital_buffer1 ratio at a 5%. 
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5.5.2.4 Deposit ratio 
 
Table 52: Deposit ratio panel regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 deposit_ratio_MV deposit_ratio_BV 
size -0.569* -0.0863*** 
 
(-1.77) (-4.50) 
 
  
profit -11.55** 0.232 
 
(-2.00) (0.67) 
 
  
collateral 0.296 -0.0854 
 
(0.22) (-1.07) 
 
  
liquidity 0.774 -0.00132 
 
(1.51) (-0.04) 
 
  
ROE 11.34 -0.313 
 
(1.57) (-0.73) 
 
  
risk 0.552 0.0674 
 
(0.45) (0.92) 
 
  
MVBV -2.093*** 0.0212** 
 (-14.18) (2.42) 
   
_cons 13.61** 1.925*** 
 (2.43) (5.77) 
N 500 500 
R2 0.507 0.117 
Table 53: Table 52: Deposit ratio (2) panel 
regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 deposit_ratio_MV deposit_ratio_BV 
size -0.647** -0.0838*** 
 
(-2.05) (-5.57) 
 
  
profit -5.041 0.158 
 
(-0.86) (0.56) 
 
  
collateral 0.267 0.0156 
 
(0.16) (0.20) 
 
  
liquidity1 2.364 0.0828 
 
(1.51) (1.11) 
 
  
ROE 1.883 -0.255 
 
(0.25) (-0.70) 
 
  
risk 0.314 0.193** 
 
(0.19) (2.48) 
 
  
MVBV -1.935*** 0.0232*** 
 (-12.47) (3.13) 
 
  
_cons 14.98*** 1.779*** 
 (2.61) (6.50) 
N 610 610 
R2 0.386 0.149 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
t statistics in parentheses 
The years are controlled for in the regressions. 
Based on data from SNL 
 
Size is negatively related. The significance is lower (10%) for the deposit_ratio_MV 
compared to 1% for the deposit_ratio_BV. 
Profit has a twofold relationship, but only the negative one with the deposit_ratio_MV 
is significant (at 5%). 
Collateral is also twofold related but insignificant in both regressions. The same is true 
for liquidity and ROE. 
Risk has a positive relationship with both ratios. Nevertheless, the results are 
insignificant. 
MVBV is twofold related and experiences significance. The deposit_ratio_MV has a 
negative relationship and the significance is 1%. However, the deposit_ratio_BV is 
positive, but only significant at 5%. 
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The use of liquidity1 instead of liquidity reveals the following outcome. 
Size is still negatively related and has gained significance (5%) in the 
deposit_ratio_MV regression. 
The direction of profit has not changed, but experiences a lack of significance both 
times. 
Collateral is no longer twofold related, but still insignificant.. 
Liquidity1 is only positively related, but insignificant. 
ROE is unchanged. 
Risk has still a positive relationship, but is now at least significant at 5% for the 
deposit_ratio_BV regression. 
The twofold correlation is still valid for MVBV, but significant at 1% both times. 
 
Differences between the OLS and the panel regressions 
Size is no longer highly significant (at the 1% level) for all regressions. For the 
deposit_ratio_MV the significance has dropped to 10%. However, the deposit_ratio_BV 
is still significant at the 1% level. 
Furthermore, in the panel regressions profit is twofold related. However, the 
deposit_ratio_MV is the only variable that is significantly related (5% level). The 
relationship is negative. 
Additionally, collateral is twofold related and no longer significant in any regression. 
The same happens to the liquidity ratio and to ROE. 
In the panel regressions risk is still positively related, but loses all significance. 
Last, MVBV still experiences a twofold relationship. However, this time both 
relations are significant. 
 
Running the regressions again, but using another variable to represent liquidity leads 
to the following results. 
Size is a little bit less significant (5%) for the deposit_ratio_MV and unchanged for 
the deposit_ratio_BV. 
Profit is twofold related, but no longer significant in any case. 
Collateral has a positive relationship, but the results are insignificant. 
Liquidity1 is positively related but insignificant. 
ROE experiences a twofold relationship now. However, the results are insignificant. 
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Risk is still positively related, but has lost significance. The deposit_ratio_MV is 
insignificant and the deposit_ratio_BV has declined to a 5% level. 
MVBV is still twofold and now significantly related with both ratios. 
 
5.6 Summary 
It can be seen that not all results can be explained by theory. Moreover, the findings 
are not necessarily the same in the OLS regression and in the panel regression. The only 
variable that seems to be independent of the regressions used is size. This variable 
already reveals a clear and significant correlation in the correlation table. Furthermore, 
profit seems to be a variable which is rather robust. 
However, the empirical research reveals that regulation does not seem to be the only 
variable that influences the equity ratio, the capital buffer, basel ratio and the deposit 
ratio. Bank specific factors such as, for example, size do play a role in the capital buffer 
decision making process. 
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6 Conclusion 
Bank financing is a complex topic. Different theories have been discussed in the 
literature. All of them have interesting aspects and none can be just rejected. They differ 
from firm financing theories, because banks have the possibility to finance them with 
deposits. These deposits have special because they seem to be insured through different 
ways. Furthermore, banks have to be cautious because they are subject to potential bank 
runs. Therefore, financing is complicated. 
Regulation (Basel I, II, III) might not be the absolute binding condition for bank 
capital, because banks seem to hold significantly more capital than required. 
The empirical literature has presented results that support the argument that there are 
other variables than regulation that influence the amount of capital held. Bank specific 
factors and environmental variables seem to have an impact on bank capital too. 
In the study that has been conducted with European banks from 2005 until 2101, the 
results show that there are factors, apart from regulation that influence the amount of 
capital held. The regressions are conducted with market and book values whenever 
possible. Furthermore, the OLS and panel regression tools are applied to the data. The 
dependent variables are again the equity ratio, the Basel ratios, the capital buffer and the 
deposit ratio. The independent variables are size, profit, collateral, two different types of 
liquidity, ROE, risk and market value to book value. The results confirm, what authors 
before have already proven, that regulation is not the only factor that influences the 
amount of capital held. However, the influence of the respective variable can vary 
across the regressions. Furthermore, the OLS and panel regressions reveal different 
outcomes. Additionally, not all the results are in line with what theory is predicting.  
In the end, it can be said that using regulation as the only variable that defines the 
capital ratio of banks, does not reflect the reality. Therefore, this approach alone can not 
explain banks’ behaviour of today. 
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Appendix 
 
I. Abstract - English 
The optimal capital structure of banks is hard to determine. Several theories in the 
literature try to explain what motivates banks to take on equity. The approaches 
consider asymmetric information, competition, deposit insurance and liquidity. 
Additionally, the financing of banks is special due to deposits. These deposits have the 
capacity to trigger a bank run. 
In order to protect claimants regulatory measures are introduced. Therefore, the 
capital structure is influenced by regulations. However, regulation does not seem to be 
the ultimate constraint for the amount of equity held by banks. In the empirical analyses 
over the past years the equity ratio has grown independently of regulatory demands. It 
can be seen that there are factors, other than regulation, that drive the amount of capital 
held by banks. 
In the empirical part these methods of analysis are applied to a dataset of European 
banks from 2005 to 2010. The regressions are conducted with market and book values, 
and split up into OLS regressions and panel regressions. The dependent variables are 
the equity ratio, the Basel ratios, the capital buffer and the deposit ratio. The 
independent variables are size, profit, collateral, two different types of liquidity, ROE, 
risk and market value to book value. The results confirm that regulation is not the only 
factor that influences the amount of capital held. 
Summing up, it can be said that regulation is not the final constraint in bank capital 
decisions. Therefore, this approach alone can not explain banks’ behaviour of today. 
  
II. Abstract – German 
Die optimale Kapitalstruktur für Banken ist schwer zu definieren. In der Literatur 
versuchen einige Theorie zu erklären, was Banken motiviert Eigenkapital zu halten. Die 
Ansätze nützen asymmetrische Information, Konkurrenz, Bankeinlagenversicherung 
und Liquidität als Erklärungsmöglichkeiten. Weiters, kennzeichnen sich die 
Selbstfinanzierungsmöglichkeiten von Banken durch die Existenz von Bankeinlagen 
aus. Diese haben die Möglichkeit einen „Bankensturm“ hervorzurufen. 
Um für die Sicherheit von Einlagen zu sorgen, wurden Regulationsmaßnahmen 
eingeführt. Trotz der genauen Regulierung zeigt sich, dass die Eigenkapitalquoten der 
Banken von den Vorgaben abweichen. Daher kann angenommen werden, dass 
Regulation nicht alleine zur Bestimmung dieser Quote beiträgt. In empirischen 
Analysen über die letzten Jahre hinweg ist die Eigenkapitalquote gestiegen.  
Aufgrund von diesen Beobachtungen wurden Faktoren analysiert, die auch im 
Zusammenhang mit der Kapitalstruktur von Banken stehen könnten. Das Ergebnis 
zeigt, dass nicht nur Regulation die Höhe verschiedener Kapitalquoten beeinflusst. 
Der empirische Teil der Arbeit analysiert einen Datensatz von Europäischen Banken 
von 2005 bis 2010 an. Die Regressionen werden mit Markt- und Buchwerten 
durchgeführt, und OLS und Panel Regressionen benutzt. Die abhängigen Variablen sind 
die Eigenkapitalquote, die Baselquote, der Eigenkapitalbuffer und die 
Bankeinlagenquote. Die unabhängigen Variablen werden definiert als Größe, Profit, 
Kreditbesicherung, zwei verschiedener Arten von Liquidität, ROE, Risiko und Markt- 
zu Buchwert. 
Die Ergebnisse bestätigen, dass Regulation nicht der einzige Faktor ist, der die 
Kapitalstruktur von Banken beeinflusst.  
Zum Schluss sei gesagt, dass die Annahme, dass Regulation alleine die 
Kapitalstruktur bestimmt nicht die Realität widerspiegelt. Daher kann dieser Ansatz für 
sich alleine genommen nicht das Verhalten heutiger Banken erklären. 
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